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Introduction
Almost all economic activity today heavily relies on fossil energy in one way or the other.
The combustion of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and is the single largest source
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions of greenhouse gases accumulate
in the atmosphere and contribute to global warming through the greenhouse eﬀect.
Consequently, the mean surface temperature is expected to rise and alter the earth’s
ecosystems over the coming decades and centuries (Socolow and Lam, 2007). While the
physical laws and regularities governing the climate are well known, empirical predictions
about the severity of climate change are extremely hard as a result of the system’s
complexity: Finding an accurate model and determining its parameters is currently not
within our reach (Millner et al., 2010). Scientiﬁc consensus is that global warming most
probably will cause a multitude of adverse eﬀects for large parts of the world’s population
(IPCC, 2007). The gains from burning coal or oil are private, the costs are public. The
climate is a global public good, and so climate change is the ultimate tragedy of the
commons. The goal of climate policy should be to break the link between economic
activity and global warming. Unless we doubt the natural science or believe that natural
ecosystems are very robust and human adaptation to altered climate simple and cheap,
only two choices remain: Reduce emissions by replacing carbon as the main source of
energy or capturing the carbon dioxide, or directly manipulate the global climate to
counteract the warming through geo-engineering. All of these alternatives are unknown
territory, and the scale of the challenge is unprecedented. There are many diverse
economics questions we have to ask. Among them are: For which level of greenhouse
gas concentrations should we aim? How can we create international agreement on the
target and split the costs involved between nations? How do we best implement those
targets at manageable costs, and when should they be implemented? How to prepare
for the climate change to come?
With this thesis I wish to contribute to the understanding of how uncertainty and
the anticipation of future events by economic actors aﬀect climate policies. Two aspects
of economic analysis therefore feature prominently in my thesis: Intertemporal decision
making and decision making under uncertainty. First, timing matters: The beneﬁts of
burning fossil fuels are immediate, but the damages will only be felt decades or even
centuries from now. A practical reason for paying particular attention to the time
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dimension are the characteristics of fossil fuels. Coal, gas and oil are non-renewable
resources and as such command economic rents. The owner of a coal mine or an oil well
has a long planning horizon and has to make the decision about when to extract the
resource. He therefore anticipates future developments and acts today.1
Secondly future climate conditions are unknown, and so are technological options, the
level of economic well-being, and the political situation. Economic analysis of climate
change hence has to properly model uncertainty and social attitudes to it (Traeger,
2012; Gollier et al., 2000; Weitzman, 2009). We usually assume that people and societies
dislike that they do not know what happens next: They are risk averse. But such a
preference alone oﬀers no behavioral advice.2 The speciﬁc conditions matters for the
optimal decision. As a simple thought experiment, suppose you are engaging in an joyful
activity that may cause you harm in the future. There is also a chance of an unrelated
negative event. You are risk averse. But since there is a chance for trouble anyway,
why be careful and cut down on the joy today just to avoid harm that you may never
experience? If on the contrary your indulgence aﬀects the chances of the adverse event,
you act prudently and reduce or abandon the joyful activity.
My thesis consists of four papers. The ﬁrst two are analytical models in which emis-
sions are caused by extracting a non-renewable resource. The latter two are numerical
integrated assessment models with a focus on uncertainty. For both paper pairs I ﬁrst
discuss the common features jointly before summarizing each paper by itself.
1 The Supply Side of CO2 and Carbon Taxes
My ﬁrst two papers treat fossil fuel extraction explicitly as the source of carbon dioxide
emissions. I model the supply side of carbon dioxide and investigate its eﬀects on the
design of climate policy. I restrict myself to one particular instrument, a tax on carbon
dioxide emissions. A universal carbon tax set at Pigou level to correct the externalities
of emissions is generally viewed by economists as an eﬃcient way to allocate abatement
activities. 3 It illustrates how the problem could be solved, and is thus a useful bench-
mark for politically feasible policies. The early literature established how the supply side
dynamics of fossil fuels inﬂuence the optimal emissions tax.4 More recently, attention
has shifted to some of the imperfections in a tax regime and unintended consequences
1Here I rely on the theoretical literature. Empirical evidence on intertemporal ﬁrm decisions is
inherently diﬃcult to produce (Krautkraemer, 1998; Kronenberg, 2008).
2As a simple example, consider adding uncertainty to a given consumption path. The volatility has
two eﬀects, an income and a substitution eﬀect. The decision maker dislikes that the future is uncertain
and ceteris paribus shifts consumption to the (more) certain present. But as expected future welfare
decreases, she also wants to shift some consumption into the future.
3At least in theory, when disregarding common imperfections such as market power, other, distor-
tionary taxes, externalities or dynamic issues such as commitment problems.
4Sinclair (1994); Ulph and Ulph (1994); Withagen (1994); Hoel and Kverndokk (1996); Tahvonen
(1997).
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that follow if there are areas or time periods not covered by the policy: Carbon leakage
is the eﬀect a climate policy in place A has on place B. For example, if a carbon tax in
A lowers the proﬁtability of fossil fuels in that region, the resource owner may instead
sell them in B, hence increasing emissions there (see Eichner and Pethig, 2011, for a
recent example). The Green Paradox refers to a similar eﬀect over time: Making the
sale of fossil fuels less proﬁtable in the future means it is more attractive to extract them
today. In the extreme case, this may imply that a future carbon tax harms the climate
(Sinn, 2008; Gerlagh, 2011).
In these two papers I also pay attention to two technological solutions to climate
change: Renewable energy and carbon capture and storage. These technologies are
currently the focus of substantial research and development eﬀorts. Investment in re-
newables may inﬂuence the rate of fossil fuel extraction and vice versa: Anticipated low
cost renewable energy means it is more proﬁtable to extract most of the resource today,
whereas huge reserves of cheap fossil fuels render investments in renewables unattrac-
tive. A policy maker may ideally want to provide diﬀerent incentives to the two market
actors: A low future tax to slow down extraction, and a high future tax to foster inno-
vation today. Related, but not the focus of my work, is the commitment problem: A
policy maker would wish to announce a high future carbon tax to foster investment in
green R&D, but when the technology exists she would want it widely disseminated. If
the carbon tax is low, this lowers the price of the new technology’s patents and increases
dissemination rates (Requate, 2005; Scotchmer, 2010).
1.1 Cutting Costs of Catching Carbon (with M. Hoel)
The ﬁrst paper, which is co-authored with Michael Hoel, asks whether some climate
friendly technologies are preferable to others. In particular, should policy makers dis-
criminate between subsidizing cost reductions in renewable energy sources such as wind
or solar power on the one hand, and abatement technologies such as carbon capture
and storage (CCS) on the other? Adding to the many conceivable arguments for and
against diﬀerentiation, we suggest one more: in a world with imperfect climate policies,
developing each of these technologies alters the incentives that fossil fuel owners face in
a diﬀerent way. While cheaper future renewables cause extraction to speed up, lower
costs of CCS may delay it.
To cease GHG emissions and at the same time secure suﬃcient energy supplies
requires the development and deployment of new, low emission power sources. Two
promising options are electricity generation from renewable sources such as wind and
solar, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Wind and solar energy are from a pure
physics perspective available at a suﬃcient scale to replace fossil fuel power generation
(MacKay, 2008). However, they remain noncompetitive on costs and various technolog-
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ical challenges remain. CCS is a technology under development meant to abate carbon
dioxide emissions by capturing large point source emissionsand storing them under-
ground. Currently, both these options raise costs relative to regular fossil fuel energy.
Consequently climate policies are necessary if they are to be deployed. At the global
level, a comprehensive international agreement that can achieve this has yet to emerge.5
This provides owners of fossil fuels with a window of unknown length during which they
can sell fossil fuels without a carbon tax or price-competitive, low-emission alternatives.
Such intertemporal reallocation undermines policy objectives as more carbon dioxide is
emitted in early periods, and potentially total emissions remain unchanged. This supply
side eﬀect has become known as the ‘green paradox’ (Sinn, 2008).
The present paper contributes to the literature on fossil fuel supply under imperfect
climate policies by focusing on diﬀerences in prospective climate friendly technologies.
In particular, we ask how reductions in the costs of CCS technology aﬀects the market
outcome. We contrast this with improvements in renewable energy technology. To
that end, we build a simple analytical two period model. In period one, emission free
technologies play no role, only conventional energy is available. However, actors know
about the arrival of alternatives in the second period. By that time, three types of energy
technology are available: conventional fossil energy, fossil energy with CCS technology
and renewable energy. Fossil fuel suppliers optimize dynamically and sell fossils to
conventional and (in period two) CCS power generators. Those sell power competitively
in the same market as renewable energy suppliers to energy end users, who are indiﬀerent
with regards to the source of their energy. Climate policy is enacted either in both
periods (as a ﬁrst best benchmark) or in the second period only. Our main ﬁnding is
that imperfect climate policies, cost reductions related to CCS may be more desirable
than comparable cost reductions related to renewable energy. The ﬁnding rests on the
incentives fossil resource owners face. With regulations of emissions only in the future,
cheaper renewables speed up extraction, whereas CCS cost reductions potentially make
fossil resources more attractive for future use, leading to postponed extraction. Further,
it is possible that renewable energy innovations lower social welfare, whereas lower costs
of CCS are in our setting always beneﬁcial.
1.2 Carbon Tax Uncertainty, Fossil Energy, and Green R&D
The ﬁrst essay does not model uncertainty explicitly, but shows how various beliefs
on the part of fossil fuel suppliers may aﬀect climate change and social welfare. In the
second paper, I explicitly analyze how uncertainty about future carbon taxes impacts in-
vestment in renewable energy and extraction of fossil resources. Does it matter whether
the uncertainty reﬂects our limited knowledge about the climate system or whether it
5Barrett (2005) has a game theoretical treatment of international climate agreements, while
Røgeberg et al. (2010) oﬀer more of a political economy approach.
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derives from political processes?
Besides the diﬃculty of predicting the magnitude of the climate’s response to in-
creased atmospheric GHG concentrations, current policy makers also need to take into
account the uncertainty regarding future policy makers: To what extent will they be
able to cooperate and cap global emissions - and what importance will they place on the
global climate issue in their policies? As climate change threatens to cause catastrophic
outcomes (Lemoine and Traeger, 2010), it would seem reasonable to expect stringent
climate policy in response. Existing climate policies, however, seem more in line with
modeling results which assume purely self-interested non-cooperative behavior (Anthoﬀ,
2011). The unwillingness of most nations to enter a binding agreement on greenhouse
gas emissions has consequently been explained as a manifestation of the tragedy of the
commons (Barrett, 2005). Since international cooperation on climate change so far has
failed to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it is a priori equally reasonable
to expect weak climate policies in the future.
I investigate how these two sources of uncertainty impact the decisions of current
policy makers regarding fossil fuel extraction and R&D investments in renewable energy.
I assume that the energy market today is supplied by scarce fossil fuels. Investments
can be undertaken to make new, non-polluting energy sources available in the future.
Distinguishing between political and scientiﬁc uncertainty, I ask how uncertainty alters
the actions of current policy makers. I assume in the model that current and future
policy makers view scientiﬁc uncertainty in the same way given the same information.
Political uncertainty, on the other hand, stems from successive decision makers giving
diﬀerent weight to the climate problem in their policies. Current regulators may then
attempt to manipulate the options available to future regulators to shift their actions
towards those desired by the current regulators. The three papers most closely related
to my contribution are Ulph and Ulph (2011), Hoel (2012a) and (Hoel, 2012b). Ulph
and Ulph (2011) investigate a situation where a government cannot set future taxes but
decides on R&D in renewable energy. They ﬁnd that uncertainty about future taxes af-
fects the incentives of the current government and clean technology investors in opposite
directions: Whereas investors want to reduce investments, governments would like to see
them increased. Their model, however, does not feature a non-renewable resource. Hoel
(2012b) investigates political and scientiﬁc uncertainty in a setting without resources
and investment in a physical capital stock rather than innovation. Finally, Hoel (2012a)
adds a non-renewable resource and studies the eﬀect of expected carbon tax rates, but
his analysis does not treat uncertainty explicitly. The present work expands on these
by going beyond their two-period models and treating the two types of uncertainty
explicitly within a fully dynamic model.
Considering investment and extraction separately, I ﬁnd that scientiﬁc uncertainty
encourages a social planner decreases early extraction and increases investment in renew-
5
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ables. Political uncertainty has the opposite eﬀect: Because the present social planner
loses control over her investments in green innovation and fossil fuel stock, she extracts
faster and invests less in renewable energy. Importantly, when considered simultane-
ously, both sources of uncertainty have ambiguous eﬀects on green investments and
the extraction proﬁle for fossil fuels. The social planner solutions can be implemented
by carbon taxes. In the case of scientiﬁc uncertainty, the optimal carbon tax equals
marginal damages. Political uncertainty on the contrary demands a tax below marginal
damages that decreases over time.
2 Optimal Climate Policy under Uncertainty
The second half of the thesis is devoted to investigating the impact of uncertainty and
learning on optimal climate policy in a numerical integrated assessment model frame-
work. The two papers in this part of the thesis set fossil fuels aside in favor of a more
detailed look the climate system. Both papers are joint work with Christian Traeger.
An integrated assessment model embeds a model of the economy in a simpliﬁed repre-
sentation of the climate system, making it possible to analyze the interactions of the two
systems and to derive economic climate policy recommendations. Several such models
have been used to calculate the optimal global social cost of carbon over the next cen-
turies. The social cost of carbon is the cost that needs to be internalized in order to
optimally trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of emissions (from production) and the costs they cause
in form of climate damages. In principle, the optimal emission path can be achieved by
a global carbon tax. While a global carbon tax or any equivalent policy is not realistic
any time soon, it is an important benchmark. With few exceptions, these integrated
assessment models do not treat uncertainty properly.6 They are solved by simultane-
ous solution methods such as optimal control, making the inclusion of uncertainty in
multiple time periods computationally infeasible.7 We construct a recursive dynamic
programming version of the DICE model by Nordhaus (2008). DICE is possibly the
most popular economic integrated assessment model of climate change. The recursive
structure enables us to model decision making under uncertainty properly. It allows us
to include uncertainty at all future dates when new decisions must be made.
6Exceptions are Kelly and Kolstad (1999); Leach (2007); Golosov et al. (2011); Crost and Traeger
(2011)
7This is in particular true of the most popular and most widely used ones: DICE (Nordhaus, 2008),
FUND (Anthoﬀ and Tol, 2010), and MERGE (Richels et al., 2004).
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2.1 Growth Uncertainty in the Integrated Assessment of Cli-
mate Change (with C. Traeger)
Assuming modest sustained income growth is tantamount to believing that future gen-
erations will be far more aﬄuent than today’s. This viewpoint is consistent with the
experience of the world economy over the last century. However, extrapolating this
tremendous growth for another century is a bold assumption. Any economic assess-
ment of long term problems must by necessity be strongly inﬂuenced by how it treats
economic growth. This is particularly true of the global warming challenge, as the
beneﬁts of preventive actions taken today will be reaped over the course of centuries.
The DICE-2007 model (Nordhaus, 2008) illustrates the importance of economic growth
assumptions well: Even in the absence of climate policy, it suggests that future gener-
ations living 100 years from now will be ﬁve times richer than today’s generation even
after the welfare costs of the uncontrolled global warming have been taken into account.
In such a setting, any costly climate action today is a redistribution of a wealth from
relatively poor current generations to aﬄuent future generations.
In our opinion, this should not be seen as the central issue of climate economics.
Growth may slow, and we need to acknowledge the substantial uncertainties in estimates
of future economic growth. Take the ongoing economic crisis in Southern Europe for
example. It may lead to the current young generation being the ﬁrst one not to surpass
their parents’ living standards since World War II. At the same time, hopes are high
that several countries in East Africa ﬁnally ‘catch up’, eradicating poverty at a more
rapid pace than ever before. In an analytic model Traeger (2010) shows that growth
uncertainty can have a major impact on the social discount rate when time and risk
preferences are modeled correctly.8 But theoretical work alone cannot determine the
eﬀect uncertainty has in the more elaborate environment of an integrated assessment
model. The model structure is too complex, and a priori one can argue that uncertainty
should both in- and decrease the social discount rate.
This paper is the ﬁrst to consistently analyze how growth uncertainty impacts op-
timal climate policies in the integrated assessment of climate change. In particular, we
ask how optimal abatement eﬀort and the optimal social cost of carbon are impacted
by future economic conditions being unknown. In studying how optimal policy with a
long time horizon depends on growth uncertainty, it is important to capture both time
and risk preferences correctly. People exhibit diﬀerent behavior when exposed to risk
and when making allocations over time. Also from a normative perspective there is no
reason why the attitude towards risk and the propensity to smooth consumption over
time should coincide in economic analysis (Traeger, 2010). The recursive structure of
8The social (or consumption) discount rate is a summary measure of how much a marginal unit of
consumption today is valued tomorrow. It hence determines the optimal trade-oﬀ between investment
costs today and beneﬁts in the future.
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the model used permits us to separate concerns about the allocation of consumption
over time from risk aversion by using Epstein-Zin preferences. The Epstein-Zin model
is a generalization of the common time additive expected utility (EUT) model. The lat-
ter expresses time and risk attitudes by one single parameter, whereas the Epstein-Zin
model features a parameter for each preference. It is the preferred model in macroe-
conomics and ﬁnance whenever recursive methods are employed. The reason is simple:
the model explains observed investment behavior far better. With Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences, the actual risk premia and the average market returns can be explained by the
same model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004).9 The analysis also allows interesting insights
in precautionary savings behavior. Most theoretical work discusses savings through the
accumulation of manmade capital only. In our model, the decision maker in addition has
the ability to save by abating carbon dioxide emissions, thus investing in ‘environmental
capital’. Those two types of savings have diﬀerent characteristics, and their interactions
are too complex to analyze theoretically.
We ﬁnd that uncertainty in the growth rate has a substantial impact on optimal
abatement and the social cost of carbon. The size and direction of the eﬀect depend on
the speciﬁcation of the risk and the time preference: If they coincide at the standard
values (RAA = η = 2), the social cost of carbon increases slightly under uncertainty,
but the eﬀect is negligible in size. Raising risk aversion (RRA = 10) and keeping
consumption smoothing constant, increases the eﬀect to modest levels: After 100 years,
the abatement rate is approximately 4 percentage points higher. With a lower aversion
to intertemporal consumption smoothing (RRA = 10, η = 2/3), the eﬀect is reversed:
Abatement is lower under uncertainty than under certainty.
2.2 Optimally Climate Sensitive Policy (with C. Traeger)
Whereas the greenhouse eﬀect has been well known for decades, the relationship between
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere and global average tempera-
tures is still not quantiﬁed. The time series observations of both quantities permit
for no precise estimate of the so called climate sensitivity.10 One main reason are the
stochastic ﬂuctuations in temperature that add random noise to the relationship. Yet
climate sensitivity is at the core of the climate change problem: If GHG emissions cause
a strong reaction in temperatures, the costs of climate change are high. If temperatures
only react moderately, the beneﬁts of reducing emissions are likely too. In this paper we
9The risk premia (the return demanded for an asset’s risk) observed in markets cannot be captured
by the standard EUT model without accepting a very strong preference for immediate gratiﬁcation,
i.e. very high interest rates. Such time preferences contradict the observed low risk free market interest
rates. These seemingly contradictive observations have been coined the equity premium puzzle and risk
free rate puzzle respectively.
10Climate sensitivity is most commonly deﬁned as the equilibrium response of global average tem-
peratures to a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere
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analyze how temperature stochasticity, uncertainty about climate sensitivity and learn-
ing aﬀect optimal climate policy. In particular, we disentangle the contributions of each
of the three phenomena to the overall impact on emission reduction eﬀort. We employ
a recursive version of the prominent integrated asssessment model DICE by (Nordhaus,
2008). By using an integrated assessment model that is calibrated to economic and
climate data, we aim for realistic orders of magnitudes in the eﬀects. We are also able
to investigate the interaction between the climate system and the economy, and how
the relation inﬂuences adjustments in both optimal abatement policies and investment
choices. Our knowledge about climate sensitivity is fundamentally diﬀerent from what
we know about temperature stochasticity. Climate sensitivity is an uncertain parameter.
Due to the poor data availability, no single, well founded probability distribution exists
that describes it. On the contrary, temperature ﬂuctuations can be accurately charac-
terized by statistical methods. We extend our baseline model by allowing for diﬀerent
attitudes to diﬀerent types of uncertainty. Employing Klibanoﬀ et al. (2009)’s smooth
ambiguity model, we let the decision maker be more averse to the subjective climate
sensitivity than to temperature volatility. This preference speciﬁcation is referred to as
ambiguity aversion.
Our analysis is closely related to the work by Kelly and Kolstad (1999). They also use
a recursive dynamic climate-economy model based on (a more dated) version of DICE to
analyze learning about climate sensitivity. They ﬁnd that learning the true parameter
is slow (in the order of 100 years) and that (with reservations for numerical accuracy)
the decision maker keeps abatement low to speed up learning about the true value.
Their work is constrained by the numerical possibilities of the day and thus does not
disentangle stochastic temperature contributions from climate sensitivity uncertainty
and learning. They do not consider ambiguity aversion and, from today’s perspective
the underlying climate model is incorrect, suggesting abatement rates for the coming
century of at most 13%. Leach (2007) expands their investigation of learning. His
model features a second uncertain parameter, the warming delay. He also focuses on
the learning process, in particular errors and the learning speed. His central result is
that learning times increase by an order of magnitude when realistically considering
multiple parameters of the climate model as uncertain.
We ﬁnd that temperature stochasticity does not alter optimal abatement but in-
creases investment. Over time the higher capital stock leads to more production and
rising emissions. Secondly, climate sensitivity uncertainty causes higher abatement ef-
forts, while investment rates remain unchanged. We conﬁrm that learning by observing
temperatures and GHG stocks is too slow to make a relevant contribution to climate
policy over the coming decades. Importantly, it is still optimal to increase abatement
to insure against the possibility of high damages. Active learning does not take place.
Finally, ambiguity aversion has, surprisingly, virtually no impact on optimal decisions.
9
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Cutting Costs of Catching Carbon: Intertemporal
eﬀects under imperfect climate policy (with Michael
Hoel)
Abstract
We use a two-period model to investigate intertemporal eﬀects of cost reductions in
climate change mitigation technologies for the power sector. With imperfect climate
policies, cost reductions related to carbon capture and storage (CCS) may be more de-
sirable than comparable cost reductions related to renewable energy. The ﬁnding rests
on the incentives fossil resource owners face. With regulations of emissions only in the
future, cheaper renewables speed up extraction (the ‘green paradox’), whereas CCS cost
reductions make fossil resources more attractive for future use and lead to postponement
of extraction.
Keywords
climate change, exhaustible resources, carbon capture and storage, renewable energy,
green paradox
A revised version of this paper is forthcoming in Resource and Energy Economics.
Chapter I
1 Introduction
Are some ‘climate friendly’ technologies preferable to others? Should policy makers
discriminate between supporting renewable energy sources such as wind or solar power
and carbon capture and storage (CCS)? Adding to the many conceivable arguments for
and against diﬀerentiation, we suggest one more: in a world with imperfect climate poli-
cies, developing these technologies alters the incentives fossil fuel owners face diﬀerently.
While cheaper renewables cause extraction to speed up, lower costs of CCS may delay
extraction.
Climate change is to be expected as a result of human activity. On aggregate, it
will almost certainly aﬀect the human condition adversely. Carbon dioxide emissions
from producing power are the single largest contribution to this process. In order to
stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level likely to
avoid the most harmful damages, emissions need to be reduced and eventually to stop. A
concentration of 450 parts per million carbon dioxide-equivalent for example is estimated
to give a 50 per cent chance of limiting the rise in global average temperature to 2 degrees
Celsius (Solomon et al., 2007). This target temperature would leave about half a trillion
tonnes of carbon to be burned (Allen et al., 2009).1
Quitting emitting GHGs and at the same time securing suﬃcient energy supplies
requires the development and deployment of new, climate friendly technologies. Two
promising options are electricity generation from renewable sources such as wind and
solar, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Wind and solar energy are in principle
physically available at a suﬃcient scale to replace fossil fuel power generation (MacKay,
2008). They are however at present not fully competitive,2 and various technological
challenges remain.3 CCS is a technology under development meant to abate carbon
dioxide emissions from large point sources by capturing them and storing them under-
ground.4
As using those technologies is more expensive than fossil fuel energy, climate poli-
cies are necessary to encourage their deployment. But a comprehensive international
agreement to limit GHG concentrations does not exist today.5 The best one therefore
can expect is a future commitment to limit climate change. This lack of strong climate
1See also Meinshausen et al. (2009). For an accessible introduction to climate science, see Socolow
and Lam (2007).
2Barrett (2009) reports that the best locations are at present competitive if a ton of carbon dioxide
is priced at about 35 US Dollars (2006 value).
3Examples are the lack of adequate power storage possibilities, buﬀering varying wind speeds and
sun hours, or the need for distributed transmission networks (Heal, 2009).
4So far, no full scale test plants are operating. Golombek et al. (2011) review several studies and
ﬁnd that the most promising types of CCS plants could be competitive at about 30 USD (2007 value)
per ton carbon dioxide.
5Barrett (2005) has a game theoretical treatment of international climate agreements, while
Røgeberg et al. (2010) oﬀer more of a political economy approach.
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policy today gives owners of fossil fuels a possibility to sell some of their exhaustible
resources prior to climate policies being implemented and climate friendly technolo-
gies being competitive. Such intertemporal reallocation undermines policy objectives as
more carbon dioxide is emitted in early periods, and potentially total emissions remain
unchanged. This supply side eﬀect has become known as the ‘green paradox’ (Sinn,
2008).
The present paper contributes to the literature on fossil fuel supply under imperfect
climate policies by focusing on diﬀerences in prospective climate friendly technologies.
In particular, we ask how reductions in the costs of the abatement technology CCS
aﬀect the market outcome. We contrast this with improvements in renewable energy
technology. To that end, we build a simple analytical two period model. In period one,
emission free technologies play no role, only conventional energy is available. However,
actors know about the arrival of alternatives in the second period. By that time, three
types of energy technology are available: conventional fossil energy, fossil energy with
CCS technology and renewable energy. Fossil fuel suppliers optimize dynamically and
sell fossils to conventional and (in period two) CCS power generators. Those sell power
competitively in the same market as renewable energy suppliers to energy end users,
who are indiﬀerent with regards to the source of their energy. Climate policy is enacted
either in both periods (as a ﬁrst best benchmark) or in the second period only.
We ﬁnd that with imperfect climate policies, cost reductions related to CCS may
be more desirable than comparable cost reductions related to renewable energy. The
ﬁnding rests on the incentives fossil resource owners face. With regulations of emissions
only in the future, cheaper renewables speed up extraction, whereas CCS cost reductions
potentially make fossil resources more attractive for future use, leading to postponed
extraction.
1.1 Literature
The current work belongs to the literature on the interaction of fossil fuel extraction
and climate change. In particular it is part of the so called ‘green paradox’ literature.
As it investigates CCS, it also links to economic analyses of this technology in other
contexts.6
Early work on the interaction of fossil resource extraction and climate change fo-
cuses primarily on optimal carbon taxes.7 The contributors investigate how varying
assumptions on accumulation of pollutants in the atmosphere, damage functions, back-
6Various aspects of the CCS technology are analyzed without taking the dynamics of the supply side
into account. Cost estimates are established, and the optimal use of the technology is investigated in
numerical models, see Al-Juaied and Whitmore (2009); Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006); Golombek
et al. (2009); I˙s¸legen and Reichelstein (2011); Lohwasser and Madlener (2009).
7Sinclair (1994); Ulph and Ulph (1994); Withagen (1994); Hoel and Kverndokk (1996); Tahvonen
(1997).
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stop technologies, extraction costs, etc. impact the optimal tax. Both rising and falling
tax paths are possible, mirroring the net present value of future damages by emissions
today. Also the transition to backstop technologies can take diﬀerent shapes, dependent
on cost functions and pollution accumulation. One recent paper in this line of research
explicitly considers CCS. Ayong Le Kama et al. (2009) determine cost conditions under
which it is optimal to use CCS as an abatement technology and describe the optimal
path of usage.
Other contributions relax the assumption of an optimal carbon tax. With varying
speciﬁcations of climate policy, new trade-oﬀs are added. Of most interest for the current
analysis is the work by Chakravorty et al. (2006). They investigate the optimal use of
abatment and renewable technologies, given a cap on the total stock of pollution in
the atmosphere at any time. Their results are that renewable and fossil energy may
be produced simultaneously, while (constant unit cost) abatement is never used before
the cap is reached, or at the same time as renewable energy is produced. With a
diﬀerent policy speciﬁcation, namely a time invariant cap on emissions at each point in
time, Smulders and van der Werf (2008) analyze substitution between clean and dirty
fossil fuels. They ﬁnd that such a policy may lead to increased usage of the relatively
dirty fossil fuel in early periods. Finally, with a time invariant constant carbon tax,
Chakravorty et al. (2011) show that the presence of learning by doing in renewable
energy technologies may speed up the extraction of fossil fuels.
While those contributions relax the assumption of optimal balancing of climate dam-
ages and abatement costs, they still presume a global policy is in place at all times.
However, the assumption of comprehensive climate policy implemented today is hard
to defend as descriptive. Another line of research therefore investigates incomplete poli-
cies. When climate policy is implemented in the future only, present emissions remain
unpriced.8 Long and Sinn (1985) investigate reactions of fossil fuel owners to surprise
changes in current and expected future prices. Sinn (2008) points explicitly at the role
of the supply side in climate policy. He shows that fossil fuel owners respond to taxa-
tion by re-allocating extraction over time: If high future taxes are expected, extraction
takes place earlier, and, under extreme assumptions, the total amount extracted remains
unaltered (the ‘green paradox’).
Di Maria et al. (2008) model multiple fossil resources diﬀering in their carbon con-
tent, ﬁnding that policy announcements may lead to more extraction of the relatively
dirty resource earlier. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) show that expensive but not
cheap backstops cause the green paradox to occur. Strand (2007) focuses on climate
friendly technologies. He demonstrates that if a technology policy today leads to fossil
fuel becoming superﬂuous in the future and other policies are absent, present carbon
8Another imperfection arises when not all judicial entities participate in a climate agreement (carbon
leakage), see Eichner and Pethig (2011); Van der Werf (2009).
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dioxide emissions will increase. Hoel (fcm) shows that such an eﬀect will also be ob-
served if an incomplete climate policy is in place, even if alternative energy technologies
become only marginally cheaper. He illustrates that it is possible for such a technological
improvement to lower social welfare.
Several authors have examined conditions under which the green paradox arises.
Gerlagh (2011) diﬀerentiates between a ‘weak’ (an increase in current emissions) and a
‘strong’ (higher cumulative damages) green paradox. Increasing extraction costs coun-
teract the strong version, while imperfect substitutes counteract both. Independently,
Grafton et al. (2010) deﬁne a weak green paradox in the same way, while they call a rise
in total atmospheric carbon dioxide a ‘strict’ green paradox. They look into eﬀects of
biofuel subsidies under both linear and nonlinear demand schedules, and with constant
and rising extraction costs. They ﬁnd numerically that the weak green paradox may
arise for a wide range of speciﬁcations.
Our contribution is to introduce CCS into the literature on imperfect climate policies.
It is fundamentally diﬀerent from other abatement options such as reduced production
or renewable energy in that it requires fossil fuels.
2 The basic model
Consider a two period model9 of demand and supply of energy. In the ﬁrst period
conventional energy x1 is supplied by power generators at price P1. The equilibrium
condition is
x1 = D˜1(P1) (1)
D˜1 is the ﬁrst period demand for energy and has standard properties.
In the second period, energy comes from three sources. In addition to conventional
energy x, renewable energy xRE and carbon capture and storage (CCS) energy xCCS
are available, so that10
x+ xCCS + xRE = D(P ) (2)
Renewable energy is supplied competitively. Marginal costs are increasing (for example
because costs are location dependent), so we have a standard supply function S. The
equilibrium condition for renewable energy is
xRE = S(P − b) (3)
9The ﬁrst period is the near future, when CCS is not yet available on full scale. A rough estimate
is 10–20 years. The second period is everything beyond that.
10The second period time index is dropped for notational convenience.
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Here, b is a shift parameter that changes the costs for all units equally.11 We can write
x+xCCS = D(P )−S(P−b). The energy market is competitive and thus power suppliers
earn zero proﬁts.
The energy price in period one is
P1 = p1 + τ1 (4)
Here, p1 is the price of fossil fuels and τ1 is a tax levied per unit of carbon.
12 The second
period price of conventional energy similarly is (for x > 0)
P = p + τ (5)
We assume that taxes are not ‘too high’ such that p > 0. A zero resource price would
mean no resource scarcity, a case we ignore (for further discussion, see Hoel, 2011). If
xCCS > 0, the price for CCS energy is
P = p(1 + γ) + c (6)
The non-energy costs per unit of CCS energy are c, whereas γ is the extra energy
required for CCS (the ‘energy penalty’). We assume that both conventional and CCS
energy are supplied. They must trade at the same price, so the conditions (5) and (6)
both hold.
There is a ﬁxed, given stock of fossil fuel F which can be extracted at no cost.13
Fossil fuel owners maximize over the two periods. Arbitrage requires that the price
grows at the rate of interest r. We get the Hotelling rule
p = p1(1 + r) (7)
Absent extraction costs, we can conclude that resource owners want to extract every-
thing, so
x1 + x+ x
CCS(1 + γ) = F (8)
Equality in (8) is conditional on energy demand being high enough (P > 0) and CCS
being not too expensive. For given carbon taxes, the equations (1) – (8) determine the
four energy quantities (the x’s) and the four prices (the P ’s and p’s) for the two periods,
11We thus have a cost function K(xRE) = bxRE + g(xRE), g′ > 0, g′′ > 0.
12We choose units such that one unit of fossil fuel is converted to one unit of conventional energy
and causes one unit of carbon emissions.
13This assumption will be relaxed in section 6.
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for given carbon taxes τ1 and τ . We assume these taxes are set such that
x1 + x = G (9)
where G is a target level for total carbon in the atmosphere.14 To avoid a trivial problem
we assume that G < F . Note that without CCS (xCCS = 0), (8) and (9) cannot be
fulﬁlled simultaneously. For (9) to hold, taxes must be set such that fossil fuel prices
and hence resource rents are zero (p1 = p = 0). Resource owners are then indiﬀerent to
extracting or not. With CCS, the amount of CCS energy is determined from (8) and
(9) to be xCCS = F−G
1+γ
.
We explore two diﬀerent scenarios. The ﬁrst one is optimal taxation. Only GHGs
in period two are of concern and they accumulate linearly, so15
τ = τ1(1 + r) (10a)
In the second scenario, climate policy is in place only in period two, implying
τ1 = 0 (10b)
Either assumption in combination with the policy target (9) determines the taxes in
both periods.
3 A perfect world – taxation in both periods
Now assume the GHG constraint is implemented by a intertemporally cost eﬃcient
taxation scheme, i.e. τ = τ1(1 + r). Demand in period one can then be written as
D˜1 ([p + τ ](1 + r)
−1) = D1(p + τ) = D1(P ). End users face the same energy price in
net present value terms in both periods. The model from section 2 can after some
simpliﬁcations be written in reduced form
F + γG = (1 + γ) [D1(P ) +D(P )− S(P − b)] (11)
p =
P − c
1 + γ
(12)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ
(13)
14Thus we focus on the share of GHGs that can be regarded as remaining in the atmosphere indeﬁ-
nitely, see Socolow and Lam (2007).
15See for example Hoel and Kverndokk (1996). With no decay of atmospheric carbon and an ex-
ogenous limit on the stock, the net present values of marginal abatement costs are equalized. This
follows from maximizing the social planner problem P1(x1) + (1+ r)
−1[P (x+ xCCS + xRE)− cxCCS −
PRE(xRE)]− μ(x1 + x+ xCCS(1 + γ))− τ1(x1 + x), where PRE is the inverse of S.
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What happens to prices and the emission proﬁle if one of the cost parameters c, b or
γ is reduced while taxes are adjusted such that the GHG target is still fulﬁlled? First
note that (11) implies that lower non-energy CCS costs c have no eﬀect on the energy
price P , even though it is now cheaper to abate. Looking at p and τ (‘breaking up’ P )
helps with the intuition. Knowing that dP
dc
= 0, one sees from (12) and (13) that
dp
dc
= − 1
1 + γ
(14)
dτ
dc
=
1
1 + γ
(15)
The reason is that even though CCS energy is now cheaper, the amount optimally used is
unaﬀected: it is given by the limit on GHGs, the available resource and the technology.
But if the amount of CCS energy produced remains unchanged, no adjustments in
allocation are desirable and the energy price is the same as before. What happens though
is that limiting GHGs gets cheaper and fossil fuel resources become more valuable. Taxes
go down and fossil fuel prices increase by the same amount. Some of the economic surplus
shifts from the regulator to the fossil fuel owners.
Turning next to the energy cost of CCS γ, the eﬀect on P is obtained from (11).
The reactions by p and τ are then retrieved from (12) and (13). Recall that G = x1+x,
D1 = x1 and D − S = x+ xCCS . We get
dP
dγ
=
G+ S −D1 −D
(1 + γ)[D′1 +D
′ − S ′] =
−xCCS
(1 + γ)[D′1 +D
′ − S ′] > 0 (16)
dp
dγ
=
1
1 + γ
dP
dγ
− P − c
(1 + γ)2
(17)
dτ
dγ
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
dγ
+
P − c
(1 + γ)2
> 0 (18)
A decrease in the extra energy required for CCS lowers energy prices, has an ambiguous
impact on fossil fuel prices and decreases the carbon tax.
The price of energy for both periods (P ) has to go down. Less energy is needed for
CCS to reduce GHGs, so more is available to end users. Extraction is in response shifted
forward in time. The tax has to be lowered too. Preventing GHG emission has become
cheaper, so a lesser opportunity cost is needed. The eﬀect on fuel price is indeterminate.
More CCS energy is supplied from the same amount of fossil fuels, lowering demand for
fossils. But the fall in energy price means less renewable energy is supplied, increasing
demand. After some manipulations of (17) one gets the following condition (recall that
F −G = xCCS(1 + γ))
dp
dγ
> 0 ⇔ F −G > (1 + γ)(P − c)[S ′ −D′1 −D′] (19)
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Large carbon reserves in the ground (F ) work in favor of a dropping fuel price, and so
does a strict limit on carbon emissions (G). On the contrary, high CCS energy costs,
a high equilibrium fossil fuel price (recall that P − c = (1 + γ)p), steep demand curves
and a steep supply curve for renewables pull in the direction of a rising fuel price as the
energy cost (γ) declines.
What are the distributional consequences? Consumer surplus increases, the regula-
tor’s revenues decrease while the eﬀect on the Hotelling rent is ambiguous. Owners of
renewable power production lose some Ricardian rent.
Finally, for a shift in the cost curve of renewables we get
dP
db
= − S
′
D′1 +D
′ − S ′ ∈ (0, 1) (20)
dp
db
=
1
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
1
1 + γ
)
(21)
dτ
db
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
γ
1 + γ
)
(22)
The positive derivative indicates that in response to a lower b, P is again reduced,
and also p and τ go down. A source of energy becoming cheaper leads to a falling
energy price. As it is a substitute for fossil energy, the derived value of the fossil
resource is decreased. And the tax is reduced to make sure that the resulting fall in
opportunity costs is reﬂected. Some of the fossil fuel is re-allocated to the ﬁrst period
(x1 = D1(P ),D
′
1(P ) < 0). Hotelling rent and regulator revenues are decreased, while
consumer surplus and the Ricardian rent for owners of renewable power go up.
Summing up, recall that all adjustments in response to technological changes in the
current section are socially cost eﬃcient. Taxation in both periods allows policy makers
to price emissions correctly. Table 1 summarizes the results. All improvements lower
the carbon tax path: it becomes cheaper for society to ‘solve’ the climate problem. For
renewables and CCS energy costs, the consumers beneﬁt from lower energy prices in
both periods. One major diﬀerence is how the fossil fuel price is aﬀected by changes in
non-energy costs of CCS and more eﬃcient renewables: the former makes a complement
to fossil resources in energy production cheaper, the latter a substitute. Total emissions
are given exogenously by G. But emissions are accelerated by a lower γ or b and left
unchanged by a reduction in c. Some economic rent is shifted from the government (the
taxation revenue falls) to resource owners (the Hotelling rent rises) when c is reduced. A
lower γ increases consumer surplus, decreases tax revenues and has no conclusive eﬀect
on fossil fuel owners. Renewable energy producers lose some Ricardian rent due to the
lower energy price. A cut in costs of renewables ﬁnally beneﬁts the owners of renewables
and the consumers while it reduces the Hotelling rent and the regulator revenues.
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Table 1: Impacts of changes in cost parameters on prices, taxes and emissions in period
one under taxation in both periods
lower c lower γ lower b
(CCS non-energy) (CCS energy) (renewable)
P
0 − −
(energy)
p
+ +/− −
(resource)
τ − − −
(tax)
x1
0 + +
(early emissions)
4 Plan B – ﬁxing it tomorrow
Now suppose a carbon tax is imposed only in the second period, i.e. τ1 = 0. This
represents for example a scenario where in the medium term the major emitting countries
agree upon a target level for GHG concentrations. Demand in period one can be written
as D˜1(p(1+r)
−1) = D1(p). Note that p is now both: the resource price (for both periods
due to the Hotelling rule) and the energy price in period one.16 P is the energy price
for period two only. The equilibrium conditions can now be reduced to
F + γG = (1 + γ)
[
D1
(
P − c
1 + γ
)
+D(P )− S(P − b)
]
(23)
p =
P − c
1 + γ
(24)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ
(25)
What do market and policy reactions to technological changes look like now? Implicit
derivation yields
dP
dc
=
D′1
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D
′ − S ′] ∈ (0, 1) (26)
dp
dc
=
1
1 + γ
(
dP
dc
− 1
)
∈
( −1
1 + γ
, 0
)
(27)
dτ
dc
=
1
1 + γ
(
γ
dP
dc
+ 1
)
∈
(
1
1 + γ
, 1
)
(28)
A lower c now decreases second period energy price P . Given standard supply and
16More precisely, the energy price in the ﬁrst period is p(1 + r)−1.
24
Cutting Costs of Catching Carbon
demand function properties the fraction is positive. Intuitively: the amount of CCS
used remains the same.17 To keep conventional energy competitive in period two, the
regulator must lower the tax. This makes fossil fuel sales in period two more attractive,
fuel prices (and hence energy prices in period one) rise and extraction is postponed.18
Secondly, changes in the energy requirement of CCS plants (γ) lead to
dP
dγ
=
G+ S −D1 −D +D′1 · (P−c)1+γ
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D
′ − S ′] =
−xCCS +D′1 · (P−c)1+γ
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D
′ − S ′] > 0 (29)
dp
dγ
=
1
1 + γ
dP
dγ
− P − c
(1 + γ)2
(30)
dτ
dγ
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
dγ
+
P − c
(1 + γ)2
> 0 (31)
The cost drop for CCS energy requires that the regulator adjusts the tax downward.
The energy price in period two must thus fall, and renewable supplies decrease. Both
eﬀects make fossil fuel sales in period two more attractive. But as more energy is derived
from the constant amount of fossil fuel used for CCS energy, residual demand drops.
Thus the ﬁnal eﬀect on fossil fuel prices is indeterminate. Manipulating (30) yields a
condition for lower energy costs of CCS leading to a drop in fossil fuel price, which is
very similar to the one derived in section 3
dp
dγ
> 0 ⇔ F −G > (1 + γ)(P − c)(S ′ −D′) (32)
Finally, a change in the cost of renewable energy b gives the following changes
dP
db
= − (1 + γ)S
′
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D
′ − S ′] ∈ (0, 1) (33)
dp
db
=
1
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
1
1 + γ
)
(34)
dτ
db
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
γ
1 + γ
)
(35)
The expressions are formally almost identical to those in section 3,19 but mind the
diﬀerence in interpretation. A cut in b increases supply of renewable energy, and P
drops. For fossil based energy to be sold in period two, p must go down. The reduction
is worth γ more to CCS than to conventional power producers, so τ must be reduced
too. As p is also the energy price in period one, more fossils are allocated to the ﬁrst
period.
In summary, the policy instrument in this scenario is incomplete: Conventional power
17The GHG cap G, the resource stock F and the conversion factor γ are unchanged.
18Also, more fossil energy supply in period two decreases P and lowers xRE .
19The denominator is by γD′1 smaller.
25
Chapter I
producers in period one pay a zero carbon tax. Hence from the outset more of the fossil
resource than socially optimal is extracted in the ﬁrst period. Table 2 summarizes the
results. All improvements again lower the tax and the second period energy price as it
Table 2: Impacts of changes in cost parameters on prices, tax and emissions in period
one under taxation in period two only
lower c lower γ lower b
(CCS non-energy) (CCS energy) (renewable)
P − − −
(price t = 2)
p
+ +/− −
(price t = 1)
τ − − −
(tax)
x1 − +/− +
(emissions t = 1)
becomes cheaper to solve the climate problem. Of most interest is the diﬀerence in cost
cuts in non-energy costs of CCS c and renewables b on the extraction proﬁle: a smaller
c shifts extraction to the second period, while lower b does the opposite.
5 Welfare eﬀects of technological changes
In our basic model, earlier extraction is not worse for the climate. Damages are caused
by the accumulated carbon stock in period two, which is given. Is it still possible (and
likely) that a reduction in c is preferable to a reduction in b due to the intertemporal
ineﬃciency? Yes, provided that the comparison is between parameter changes that
give the same total cost reductions. To see this, consider ﬁrst the welfare eﬀects of
an incremental change Δc in the cost of CCS. The total eﬀect on social welfare W
(discounted to period 1) is found by diﬀerentiating total welfare with respect to c20
dW
dc
= − (1 + r)−1 xCCS + P1dx1
dc
+ (1 + r)−1 P
dx
dc
(36)
The ﬁrst term is the direct cost eﬀect. Initial social CCS costs are cxCCS. The second
and third term give the welfare eﬀects of changes in conventional fuel use in period one
20W =
∫ x1
0
P1(y)dy+(1+r)
−1
(∫ x+xCCS+xRE
0
P (y)dy − cxCCS −K(xRE)
)
, whereK(xRE) = bxRE+
g(xRE) are the costs of renewable energy, and P (y), P1(y) are the inverse demand functions. Noting
that P = K ′ yields the following results.
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and two. The changes in these quantities are multiplied by the consumer prices, i.e.
the marginal utilities. Changes in the two other energy sources in period two are not
included. For renewable energy, consumer price minus marginal costs is equal to zero.
Recall that CCS energy use is determined by xCCS = F−G
1+γ
. It thus does not change
with changes in c (dxCCS/dc = 0). Since dx/dc = −dx1/dc (from x1 + x = G), we may
rewrite this expression as
dW
dc
= − (1 + r)−1 xCCS + [P1 − (1 + r)−1 P ] dx1
dc
(37)
In the social optimum (section 3) the term in square brackets is zero, so the total welfare
eﬀect consists only of the direct eﬀect −(1 + r)−1xCCSΔc. However, when there is no
carbon tax in the ﬁrst period, the model in section 2 implies21 that the term in square
brackets equals (1 + r)−1 (−τ), giving
dW
dc
= − (1 + r)−1
[
xCCS + τ
dx1
dc
]
(38)
We know that a reduction in c decreases extraction in period 1, i.e. dx1/dc > 0. The
second term in square brackets thus adds to the direct positive eﬀect on welfare of
reduced costs.
Proceeding in exactly the same way with a change in b, we ﬁnd
dW
db
= − (1 + r)−1
[
xRE + τ
dx1
db
]
(39)
We know that a reduction in b increases extraction in period one, i.e. dx1/db < 0.
The second term in square brackets thus reduces the direct positive eﬀect on welfare
of reduced costs. For decreases in c and b that give the same total cost reductions,
i.e. ΔcxCCS = ΔbxRE , it follows that reduced costs of CCS increase welfare more than
reduced costs of renewables.
Notice also that the term
[
xRE + τ(dx1/db)
]
can be negative if xRE is suﬃciently
small and S ′(C ′(xRE)− b) ≥ s¯ > 0 for all xRE ≥ 0 (where C ′ − b is the marginal cost of
renewables). To see this, rewrite dx1/db
dx1
db
=
1
db
1
D′1
dp =
1
db
1
D′1
dp
db
db (40)
which after inserting from (34) gives
dx1
db
=
1
−D′1
S ′
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D
′ − S ′] (41)
21Recall that P1 = p1, p = p1(1 + r) and P = p+ τ .
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The term dx1/db will have an upward bound that is below zero provided that S
′(C ′(xRE)−
b) ≥ s¯ > 0 for all xRE ≥ 0. For suﬃciently small values of xRE the term [xRE + τ(dx1/db)]
must therefore be negative (for τ > 0), implying that social welfare declines as a re-
sponse to reduced costs of renewable energy. The intuition is that for a suﬃciently low
initial value of renewable energy, the direct eﬀect of the reduced cost is so small that it
is dominated by the indirect negative welfare eﬀect of reallocating extraction from the
future to the present.
6 The general model
The model is so far quite rigid. First, it has been assumed that there are no residual
emissions from CCS power stations. However, CCS is expected to remove only about 90
per cent of carbon dioxide emissions (IPCC, 2005). Second, we simpliﬁed by assuming
a ﬁxed amount of fossil fuel resources available, all of which can be extracted at the
same constant unit cost (set to zero). Third, in the basic model the level of GHG
concentration is exogenous and the timing of emissions is irrelevant. We now relax all
of these assumptions for the case of taxation in period two only (τ1 = 0). We show that
improvements in renewables still speed up extraction, while cheaper CCS slows it down.
6.1 Extensions
Equations (1) – (5) from the model in section 2 remain unchanged
x1 = D˜1(P1) (1*)
x+ xCCS + xRE = D(P ) (2*)
xRE = S(P − b) (3*)
P1 = p1 (4*)
P ≥ p+ τ (= p+ τ if x > 0) (5*)
The extensions concern the equations (6) – (10). First, the price of CCS energy has
to account for residual emissions. Let producing one unit of CCS energy cause δ units
of emissions (δ ∈ (0, 1)). CCS energy producers now pay τδ in carbon tax per unit of
energy. The new price of CCS energy is
P ≥ p(1 + γ) + c+ τδ (6*)
Secondly, extraction costs change the price of fossils. A complete formal treatment of
extraction costs is deferred to appendix A. We assume that the extraction costs are
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independent of the extraction rate, but increase with accumulated extraction.22 To
simplify, extraction costs are assumed zero for all extraction up to a level f which is
larger than the equilibrium extraction in period one. Beyond that level, extraction costs
are positive and rising. We call the costs in period two A(F ). With those changes,
the Hotelling rule remains valid, but the second period resource price is determined by
marginal extraction costs
A′(F ) = p = (1 + r)p1 (7*)
The total amount extracted F becomes endogenous. It is a function of the resource
price, F (p) with F ′ > 0. The case treated previously was the limiting case of F ′ = 0.
The constraint on total extraction (8) hence becomes
x1 + x+ x
CCS(1 + γ) = F (p) (8*)
G now includes residual emissions from CCS energy production, so
x1 + x+ δx
CCS = G (9*)
The amount of CCS used is now xCCS = F−G
1+γ−δ
. Finally, total emissions G become
endogenous by including climate costs. According to Allen et al. (2009), the peak
temperature increase is approximately insensitive to the timing of emissions. However,
we would expect this peak temperature increase to occur earlier the more of the emissions
occur at an early stage. It also seems reasonable to expect climate costs to be higher the
more rapidly the temperature increases. We therefore model climate costs as increasing
in the two variables G, x1. To simplify, but without changing anything of substance,
we assume that the climate cost function is given by E(G + σx1), where E
′ and σ are
positive. The optimal (Pigovian) carbon tax in period two thus is
τ = E ′(G+ σx1) (10b*)
This gives G as G = E ′(−1)(τ)− σx1 = Λ(τ)− σx1.23
6.2 Results
As the calculations follow the same steps for the basic model, we defer most of them to
appendix B. Again, after some calculation the model can be written in reduced form
22The basic model in section 2 treated the limiting case, where we assumed constant (zero) unit cost
of extraction combined with an absolute upper limit on accumulated extraction.
23Note that x1 = D1(p) as there is no carbon tax in period one. If taxes were set optimally also in
period one, x1 would depend on this tax. If σ = 0 as before τ1 = (1 + r)
−1τ . However, if σ > 0, the
optimal tax in period one would be higher.
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as three equations in three unknowns (P, p, τ). We focus on the eﬀects of reducing the
CCS non-energy costs c and the costs of renewables b. We show in appendix B that
dp
dc
< 0 (42)
dp
db
> 0 (43)
The ﬁrst period energy price (= P1 = p1 = (1 + r)
−1p) increases with cheaper CCS
and falls with cheaper renewables. In response to the higher price, demand falls, thus
making extraction go down in period one (and vice versa). Thus the main result obtained
from the basic model is robust to the extensions introduced here: While lower costs for
renewables aggravate the intertemporal ineﬃciency caused by taxation being unavailable
in period one, lower costs of CCS dampen it. Overall, for changes in b, the generalizations
do not change the results found in the basic model. The direction of eﬀects on prices
and carbon tax remain the same, as summarized in table 3. For changes in c, we ﬁnd
Table 3: Impacts of changes in cost parameters in the extended model under taxation in
period two only
lower c lower b
(CCS non-energy) (renewable)
P
+/− −
(price t = 2)
p
+
−
(price t = 1)
τ − −
(tax)
x1 − +
(emissions t = 1)
F
+
−
(extraction)
G
+/− −
(total emissions)
E − −
(climate damage)
one relevant diﬀerence between the basic and the general model: In the basic model, we
found dP/dc < 0, while the sign of dP/dc now is indeterminate. It is positive if
(1− δ)F ′ − [1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ]D′1 > γΛ′ (44)
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In comparison, in the original model the eﬀect was always positive. We observe that
the ambiguity stems from the endogenization of the GHG cap G (in the original model
we had Λ′ = 0), whereas extraction costs of the form A(F ) in period two do not change
the qualitative result from the original model.
We may now also ask what happens to the now endogenous total extraction F ,
stock of carbon in the atmosphere G and climate damage E. Firstly, since F ′(p) > 0,
it follows, not surprisingly, that total extraction goes up with cheaper CCS. Second,
the total stock of GHGs is determined by G = Λ(τ) − σD1(p) As we assume σ > 0, a
reduction in b decreases G (both p and τ fall), while a reduction in c has an ambigious
eﬀect (due to p rising). Less early emissions decreases the additional harm they cause
(as expressed by σ > 0), hence opening up for increased total emissions.24 The eﬀect
on marginal climate costs can be read out of (10b*): τ = E ′(G + σx1) As τ falls in
response to a lower b or c, so must E ′. Since E is increasing and strictly convex, a lower
derivative indicates lower total climate costs. Results are summarized in table 3.
6.3 Welfare eﬀects
Also the welfare analysis from the basic model carries over to the more general version:
A cost reduction in c is preferable to a reduction in b if they provide the same total cost
reductions. In appendix C we derive the following equation
dW
dc
=− 1
1 + r
E ′(1 + σ)
dx1
dc
+ xCCS (45)
The two terms on the right hand side have the same sign for a lower c: xCCS is positive,
and x1 decreases in response to lower CCS non-energy costs. Diﬀerentiating with respect
to b yields
dW
db
=− 1
1 + r
E ′(1 + σ)
dx1
db
+ xRE (46)
For lower costs of renewables b, the two terms on the right hand side have opposing
signs: x1 goes up in response to lower costs of renewables. So while lower costs of
renewables have a beneﬁcial eﬀect for inframarginal units of renewable energy, it worsens
the intertemporal misallocation provoked by the policy imperfection. Lower CCS costs c
on the contrary have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the imperfection. For parameter changes that
giver the same total cost reductions (ΔcxCCS = ΔbxRE) we see that a cost reduction in
CCS is preferable.
24We regard this however not as a very likely outcome.
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7 Concluding remarks
We set out to analyze how an improvement in CCS technology inﬂuences energy and
fossil fuel prices and the timing of GHG emissions, and how it compares to a downwards
shift in renewable energy costs. We used a simple two period model that links a market
for some stylized fossil fuel to a market for energy. One robust result is that all types of
technological improvement give a lower optimal carbon tax in period two. Other eﬀects
of technological improvements depend both on the type of technological improvement
and on whether climate policy is optimally designed in both periods or only in period
two. Key results are summarized in tables 1 to 3. One important conclusion is that if
there is no carbon tax in period one, lower non-energy costs for CCS have the opposite
eﬀect on period one emissions of lower costs of renewable energy. This is an important
diﬀerence, as emissions are too high in period one when there is no carbon tax in this
period. We showed that the increase in period one emissions resulting from reduced
costs of renewable energy might even lead to lower social welfare. A lower non-energy
cost of CCS will decrease period one emissions, and therefore always increase social
welfare.
As for policy implications, under speciﬁc circumstances supporting the development
of CCS is preferable from supporting renewables. What are these circumstances? One
has to believe that a future climate policy will come into being. Second, fossil fuel
producers’ ability to reallocate production needs to be large enough for the eﬀect to
matter. Also, both technologies are assumed to be available on suﬃcient scale at the
same time. If renewables are ready earlier (or later), the picture changes. And if one
believes that climate policy will not even be implemented in the future, supporting
renewables may be preferable for another reason: they at least potentially can compete
with conventional energy, while CCS will always impose an additional cost.
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Appendix
A Extraction costs
Assume that the extraction costs are independent of the extraction rate, but increase
with accumulated extraction. Total extraction F becomes endogenous.25 Formally, we
let each unit of the resource be indexed by a continuous variable z, and let a(z) be
the cost of extracting unit z, with a′ ≥ 0. In the two-period model x1 is extraction
in period one and x + xCCS(1 + γ) = F − x1 is extraction in period two. The cost
of extracting x1 is thus given by A(x1) =
∫ x1
0
a(z)dz, and cost of extracting F − x1 is∫ F
x1
a(z)dz =
∫ F
0
a(z)dz − ∫ x1
0
a(z)dz = A(F ) − A(x1). Notice that these relationships
imply that A′(x1) = a(x1) and A
′(F ) = a(F ). The limiting case of a constant unit
cost a of extraction up to an exogenous limit F¯ would imply that A(x1) = ax1 and
A(F )− a(x1) = a · (F − x1) (up to F¯ ).
We now simplify and assume that extraction costs are zero for all extraction up to a
level f which is larger than the equilibrium extraction in period one, so that A(x1) = 0
for all relevant values of x1 in period one. Moreover, let extraction costs a(F ) be positive
and rising for extraction levels above f , so that costs in period two are A(F ) which is
rising for F > f and strictly convex.
B Solving the general model
With the changes from section (6) the reduced form model is
[1− δ]F
(
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ
)
+ γΛ
(
γP + c
1 + γ − δ
)
= (1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ)D1
(
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ
)
+ (1 + γ − δ) [D(P )− S(P − b)] (B.1)
p =
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ (B.2)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ − δ (B.3)
Implicit diﬀerentiation of (B.1) with respect to b gives
dP
db
=
−(1 + γ − δ)2S′
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1 − δ)D′1 + (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S′]− (1− δ)2F ′ − γ2Λ′
(B.4)
The expression is positive (note that Λ′ > 0 and F ′ > 0) and bounded above by one.
This mirrors the directions of the eﬀects in the basic model. Likewise do the eﬀects on
25This is a speciﬁcation frequently used in the resource literature, see e.g. Heal (1976) and Hanson
(1980).
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p and τ which can be obtained by inserting (B.4) in diﬀerentials of equations (B.2) and
(B.3) respectively. Again, the ﬁrst period energy (and resource) price p goes down in
response to a reduction of the costs of renewables, and so does the tax τ . Diﬀerentiating
with respect to c we get
dP
dc
=
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ]D′1 − (1− δ)F ′ + γΛ′
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1 − δ)D′1 + (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S′]− (1− δ)2F ′ − γ2Λ′
(B.5)
The eﬀect on the second period price is ambiguous as the numerator contains negative
as well as positive terms. It is positive if
(1− δ)F ′ − [1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ]D′1 > γΛ′ (B.6)
The change in p can again be calculated from (B.2)
dp
dc
=
1
1 + γ − δ
[
(1− δ)dP
dc
− 1
]
(B.7)
The eﬀect is negative: If dP
dc
is negative, it follows immediately. If dP
dc
is positive, it needs
to be true that (1− δ)dP
dc
< 1 for the eﬀect to still be negative, so we require that
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 − (1− δ)2F ′ + (1− δ)γΛ′
> [1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 + (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S ′]− (1− δ)2F ′ − γ2Λ′ (B.8)
Simplifying
[(1− δ)γ + γ2]Λ′ > (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S ′] (B.9)
The last equation is always true, as the left hand side contains only positive terms and
the right hand side only negative ones. So the ﬁrst period energy price rises in response
to a fall in non-energy costs of CCS. Thus the main ﬁnding of the original model is
robust towards the discussed generalizations.
The eﬀect on the carbon tax τ is (from B.3)
dτ
dc
=
1
1 + γ − δ
(
γ
dP
dc
+ 1
)
(B.10)
We see that if γ dP
dc
> −1, then like in the original model the tax decreases in response
to lower non-energy costs of CCS. Inserting and rearranging
γ(1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ)D′1 − γ(1− δ)F ′
< −[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 − (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S ′] + (1− δ)2F ′ (B.11)
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(B.11) shows that the inequality always holds. The LHS contains only negative terms,
the RHS only positive ones. In line with the original model, the tax decreases in response
to lower non-energy costs of CCS.
C Welfare eﬀects in general model
Welfare is deﬁned as
W =
∫ x1
0
P1(y)dy +
1
1 + r
[∫ x+xCCS+xRE
0
P (y)dy − cxCCS − bxRE − g(xRE)
−A (x1 + x+ (1 + γ)xCCS)− E ((1 + σ)x1 + x+ δxCCS)] (C.1)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to c
dW
dc
=P1(x1) · dx1
dc
+
1
1 + r
[
P ·
(
dx
dc
+
dxCCS
dc
+
dxRE
dc
)
− xCCS − cdx
CCS
dc
− bdx
RE
dc
− g′RE − A′ ·
(
dx1
dc
+
dx
dc
+ (1 + γ)
dxCCS
dc
)
−E ′ ·
(
(1 + σ)
dx1
dc
+
dx
dc
+ δ
dxCCS
dc
)]
(C.2)
Rearranging some and noting that A′ = p = (1+ r)p1, E
′ = τ and using equations (5*)
and (6*) we get the result in equation (45)
dW
dc
=− xCCS − 1
1 + r
E ′(1 + σ)
dx1
dc
Diﬀerentiating with respect to b and proceeding in the same way as above yields equation
(46)
dW
db
=− xRE − 1
1 + r
E ′(1 + σ)
dx1
db
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Chapter II
Carbon Tax Uncertainty, Fossil Energy and Green
R&D
Abstract
Using an analytical model, I investigate how uncertainty about future carbon tax levels
inﬂuences decisions to invest in green innovation and to extract scarce fossil resources.
I distinguish between two sources of uncertainty: Scientiﬁc uncertainty about the sever-
ity of climate change impacts, and uncertainty about future political processes. When
future policies are uncertain, the present regulator attempts to impose her preferences
on future decision makers by her choices. When investment and extraction decisions
are considered independently, I ﬁnd that the two sources of uncertainty have oppos-
ing eﬀects: Scientiﬁc uncertainty delays fossil fuel extraction and increases green R&D,
whereas political uncertainty has the opposite eﬀect. Most importantly, I ﬁnd that nei-
ther source of uncertainty leads to unambiguous changes in extraction or investment
when those decisions are considered simultaneously.
Keywords
climate change, renewable energy, exhaustible resources, green R&D, uncertainty, learn-
ing, commitment
Chapter II
1 Introduction
How does uncertainty about future carbon taxes impact investment in renewable energy
technologies and extraction of fossil resources? Does it matter whether the uncertainty
reﬂects our limited knowledge about the climate system or whether it derives from
political processes? Considering investment and extraction decisions separately, I ﬁnd
that scientiﬁc uncertainty delays extraction of fossil fuels and increases investment in
renewables technologies. Political uncertainty on the contrary leads to faster extraction
and less innovation investments. Considered simultaneously, both sources of uncertainty
have ambiguous eﬀects on both green investments and the extraction proﬁle for fossil
fuels.
Uncertainty is a central feature of the climate change challenge. There are limits to
our understanding of the global warming impact of atmospheric greenhouse gas concen-
trations. Millner et al. (2010) distinguish between two types of scientiﬁc knowledge: Sci-
entiﬁc principles and physical laws which may be well known, and empirical knowledge,
which is very limited. The climate system is so complex that it is diﬃcult to estimate
single causal relations with a high degree of conﬁdence. Politics are an obvious second
source of uncertainty: To what extent will nations cooperate and cap global emissions?
As climate change threatens to cause catastrophic outcomes (Lemoine and Traeger,
2010), it seems reasonable to expect stringent climate policy in response. Existing cli-
mate policies however seem more in line with models assuming purely self-interested,
non-cooperative behavior (Anthoﬀ, 2011). The unwillingness of most nations to enter
a binding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions has consequently been explained as
a manifestation of the tragedy of the commons (Barrett, 2005). Since international
cooperation on climate change so far has failed to substantially reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, it is a priori equally reasonable to expect weak climate policies in the future.
In this paper I investigate how these two sources of uncertainty impact fossil fuel
extraction and R&D investments in renewable energy. I assume that the energy market
today is supplied by scarce fossil fuels. Investments can be undertaken to make new, non-
polluting energy sources available in the future. I ask how the two types of uncertainty
aﬀect incentives of market actors and regulators. I assume that scientiﬁc uncertainty is
perceived equally by current and future policy makers. Political uncertainty stems from
successive regulators having diﬀering ‘preferences’ for the climate.1 Current regulators
may attempt to manipulate the options available to future regulators, who may aim for
more or less global warming.
1I remain deliberately unspeciﬁc about the source of those diﬀerences since it is not the focus of
the current work. A future government may have a diﬀerent constituency with diﬀerent interests for
example. If one stresses the global nature of climate change instead, the outcome of future climate
negotiations is highly uncertain for today’s national decision makers. See for example the non-binding
COP17 agreement to reach a binding agreement by 2015 to be implemented by 2020.
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The three papers most closely related to my work are Ulph and Ulph (2011), Hoel
(2012a) and (Hoel, 2012b). Ulph and Ulph (2011) investigate a situation where a gov-
ernment cannot set future taxes but decides on R&D in renewable energy. They ﬁnd
that uncertainty about future taxes aﬀects the incentives of the current government
and clean technology investors in opposite directions: Whereas investors want to reduce
investments, governments would like to see them increased. Their model, however, does
not feature a non-renewable resource. Hoel (2012b) investigates political and scientiﬁc
uncertainty in a setting without resources and with investment stock of green physical
capital rather than R&D. Finally, Hoel (2012a) adds a non-renewable resource and stud-
ies the eﬀect of expected carbon tax rates, but his analysis does not treat uncertainty
explicitly. The present work expands on these by going beyond their two-period models
and treating the two types of uncertainty explicitly within a fully dynamic model. In
the wider sense this work relates to the “Green Paradox” literature (Sinn, 2008). In
fossil fuel markets, a known future carbon tax leads to adjustments of the extraction
proﬁle that may counteract or even cancel the intent of the climate policy, dependent
on extraction costs, tax level and other parameters (Gerlagh, 2011). The same may
be true for anticipated renewable energy technologies (Hoel and Jensen, 2010). More
remotely related is the literature on incentives to invest in new green technology (Re-
quate, 2005), in particular the work on commitment problems: An ex ante optimal
policy to elicit investment in renewable energy is, after the investment is undertaken,
not suited to disseminate the technology in a socially eﬃcient manner. Hence the reg-
ulator faces a commitment problem. Optimal solutions may therefore require multiple
policy instruments (Montero, 2010; Scotchmer, 2010).
The paper proceeds with section 2, which introduces the model and analyzes scientiﬁc
uncertainty. For expositional reasons, I cast it in terms of a social planner. Section 3
amends the model to accomodate political uncertainty. In section 4 I lay out how the
social planner solutions can be implemented by carbon taxes in a market, before section
5 concludes. Some details of the necessary calculations are left to the Appendix A, while
some required numerical simulations are found in Appendix B.
2 Scientiﬁc uncertainty
A social planner is concerned about welfare, derived from consuming energy and reduced
by climate damages from fossil fuel combustion. She chooses an extraction path for a
fossil resource and how much to invest in renewable energy technology. Social welfare
is determined by energy consumption and climate damages. It is increasing and cocave
in energy consumption (U ′ > 0,U ′′ < 0). I distinguish two large scale sources of energy:
Fossil fuel and renewable energy. A ﬁxed amount of fossil fuel R0 is available at the
beginning of the planning horizon (measured in energy units). Each point in time,
41
Chapter II
x(t) units are extracted. Extraction costs are constant, and for simplicity set to zero.
Renewable energy yt has constant unit cost b(I) which depend on the level of R&D
eﬀort I prior to the exogenous time T .2 I assume that b(I) is decreasing and convex in
innovation eﬀort (b′(I) < 0, b′′(I) > 0). I distinguish two cases of information. First I
assume the damages are known at all times, and that the present social planner evaluates
them with v. Second, I assume they are uncertain until T when they become known.
There are two possible sources of uncertainty concerning damages. First, the social
planner does not know for sure what the damages are, but learns so at T . Call this
scientiﬁc uncertainty. Alternatively, I assume that the current social planner is not in
charge in the future (from T onwards). The future social planner’s evaluation of climate
change V is not known today. Call this political uncertainty.
2.1 Formal setup for scientiﬁc uncertainty
The social planner facing scientiﬁc uncertainty has the following objective:
max
{xt,yt}
∞
0 ,I
E
[∫ ∞
0
(U(x(t) + y(t))− b(I)y(t)− v˜x(t)) e−rt d t
]
− I
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(0) given .
The evaluation of climate damages v˜ is unknown before T and known thereafter. I
simplify the analysis by splitting the decision problem into two periods, referring to the
time before and after the resolution of uncertainty (see Hoel (1978))
max
S,I
{g(S)− I + EG(S, b(I), v˜)} (1)
where
g(S)− I =max
{xt}
∫ T
0
(U(x(t))− Ev˜x(t)) e−rt d t− I (2)
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(0) given R(T ) = S
G(S, b(I), v) = max
{xt,yt}
∫ ∞
T
(U(x(t) + y(t))− b(I)y(t)− vx(t)) e−rt d t (3)
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(T ) = S
Only two decisions remain to be made under uncertainty: Investment in renewables
technology I, and how much of the resource to leave for the time after the uncertainty
is resolved, S (equation 1). The maximization in (2) is carried out under certainty:
The best the social planner can do is optimize with respect to the expected value of the
2I can be thought of as the net present value of R&D costs during that period. That investment
takes place only prior to T is a convenient simpliﬁcation.
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damages. It is a standard Hotelling problem for a given amount of fossil fuels R(0)−S.
Marginal utility must increase over time at the social discount rate. Call the optimal
value of maximization problem (2) g(S)− I. Likewise, the optimization problem (3) is
equivalent to a standard nonrenewable resource problem with a backstop. After learning
the true value of v, the social planner re-optimizes. Again fossil fuel extraction follows a
Hotelling path. Only when the resource is exhausted at date τ will the green alternative
be used. (see Appendix A for more detail). Call the optimal value of maximization
problem (3) G(S, b(I), v˜).
2.2 Analysis of scientiﬁc uncertainty
Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for (1) under certainty and uncertainty isolates the
consequences of scientiﬁc uncertainty. When v is known from the beginning the ﬁrst
order conditions read
gS(S) +GS(S, b(I), v) = 0 (4)
−1 +Gb(S, b(I), Q)b′(I) = 0 . (5)
Under scientiﬁc uncertainty (v˜) I get
gS(S) + E [GS(S, b(I), v˜)] = 0 (6)
−1 + E [Gb(S, b(I), v˜)] b′(I) = 0 . (7)
I assume that Ev˜ = v. By Jensen’s inequality we know that the impact of introducing
uncertainty in v˜ on S and I depends on whether GS and Gb are convex or concave in
v˜.3 GS and Gb are given by
4
GS = μ(T ) = (b− v)e−rτ(v) > 0 (8)
Gb = −y
r
e−rτ(v) < 0 , (9)
where the date of exhaustion τ(v) is deﬁned implictly by∫ τ
0
U ′(−1) (v + e−r(τ−t)(b− v)) d t = S . (10)
The signs of GSvv and Gbvv cannot be determined analytically. I hence proceed by
numerically simulating those two derivatives. Details on the simulation procedure are
found in Appendix B. I ﬁnd that under a wides range of assumptions GS is convex and
Gb is concave in damages (GSvv > 0 and Gbvv < 0).
3For an increase in risk in v˜ one would need the equivalence result by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
4See Appendix A for all detailed calculations.
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Proceeding under this assumption and making use of Jensen’s inequality, I simplify
the expressions by denoting the diﬀerence between the value functions for [T,∞) under
certainty and uncertainty as ω, ξ > 0.
GS(S, b(I),Ev˜) < E [GS(S, b(I), v˜)] = GS(S, b(I),Ev˜) + ω (11)
Gb(S, b(I),Ev˜) > E [Gb(S, b(I), v˜)] = Gb(S, b(I),Ev˜)− ξ (12)
This gives us the ﬁrst order conditions for the case of scientiﬁc uncertainty (equations
(6) and (7)) as
gS(S) +GS(S, b(I),Ev˜) + ω = 0 (13)
−1 + [Gb(S, b(I),Ev˜)− ξ] b′(I) = 0 . (14)
Diﬀerentiating (13) and (14) yields the eﬀects of introducing uncertainty on the optimal
choices S and I. Under slight abuse of notation, I will use d ξ = ξ and dω = ω since
under certainty ω = ξ = 0.
gSS dS +GSS dS +GSbb
′ d I + ω = 0
GSbb
′ dS + (Gbb(b
′)2 +Gbb
′′) d I − b′ξ = 0
Rearranging and writing in matrix form(
gSS +GSS GSbb
′
GSbb
′ Gbb(b
′)2 +Gb(b
′′)
)
·
(
dS
d I
)
=
(
−ω
b′ξ
)
The ﬁrst matrix is the Hessian matrix. Call it M. Making use of Cramer’s rule, I ﬁnd
that dS is
dS =
∣∣∣∣∣−ω GSbb
′
b′ξ (Gbb(b
′)2 +Gb(b
′′))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣M∣∣∣
=
1
|M|
(
Gbb(b
′)2 +Gb(b
′′)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(−ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
− (GSbb′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(b′ξ)︸︷︷︸
−
(15)
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Proceeding the same way for d I
d I =
∣∣∣∣∣gSS +GSS −ωGSbb′ b′ξ
∣∣∣∣∣
|M|
=
1
|M| (gSS +GSS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(b′ξ)︸︷︷︸
−
− (−ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(GSbb
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(16)
For both dS and dI the sign of the eﬀect is ambiguous. To see that, note that the deter-
minant of the Hessian Matrix in the denominator must be positive in a local optimum.
Further, by assumption, b′ < 0 and in Appendix A I show that GSb > 0. Finally, as
the Hessian is negative semi-deﬁnite, the elements on the main diagonal are negative,
i.e. gSS + GSS < 0 and Gbb(b
′)2 + Gb(b
′′) < 0. Without more speciﬁc assumptions, for
example a simple calibration of the model to real world data, it is not possible to say
how a social planner should adjust to scientiﬁc uncertainty. To understand how the
result comes about, I now look at each decision separately.
2.3 Special cases: Exogenous investment or extraction
If investment in green innovation is exogenously given, the eﬀect of uncertainty on early
extraction R0 − S is found from the equation (12) alone
dS =
−ω
gSS(S) +GSS(S, b(I¯))
> 0
For ω > 0, early extraction decreases (dS > 0). This result is in line with ﬁndings in
the earlier resource literature (Hoel, 1978; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1981). Intuitively, it
is beneﬁcial to wait with the extraction until a decision can be taken based on more
information.
Secondly, if resource extraction is exogenous, we get the eﬀect of uncertainty on
investment in renewable technology I from (13)
d I =
ξb′
Gbb(b′)2 +Gb(b′′)
> 0 .
The social planner invests more in renewable resource technologies when she is uncertain
about future climate damages. Intuitively, she insures herself against an undesirable
outcome by having more of the clean substitute available.
Returning to the case of joint investment and extraction, we observe the following
interaction between the two decisions: Ceteris paribus uncertainty means more invest-
ment in renewable technology. But lower costs of renewable energy in the future depress
the proﬁtability of fossil fuels. Hence more is extracted earlier, counteracting the eﬀect
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uncertainty has on extraction. Likewise, given that uncertainty ceteris paribus implies
that more of the fossil resource is available in the future, investment in renewable energy
technology becomes less attractive, which counteracts the original eﬀect uncertainty has
on investments.
3 Political uncertainty
So far I assumed that the uncertainty was caused by initial lack of knowledge about
the climate system. Now I consider political processes as a second possible source
of uncertainty. I assume that the current social planner is uncertain about a future
planner’s evaluation of climate damages. Again she can aﬀect future outcomes in two
ways: Via lowering the costs of renewables by investing (I), and via the supply of fossil
fuel (S).
3.1 Formal setup for political uncertainty
Modeling political uncertainty requires the introduction of a second social planner who
optimizes after T . The social planner prior to T now knows her own valuation v but
not the future planner’s evaluation V . I assume that she has no systematic bias, so her
expectation is EV˜ = v. The social planner anticipates the behavior of her successor
when optimally choosing extraction and investment
max
S,I
{
g(S)− I + EG1(I, b(I), v, V˜ )
}
(17)
where
g(S)− I = max
{x}
∫ T
0
(U(x(t))− vx(t)) e−rt d t− I (18)
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(0) given R(T ) = S
G1(S, b(I), v, V˜ ) =
∫ ∞
T
(U(xˆ(t) + yˆ(t))− b(I)yˆ(t)− vxˆ(t)) e−rt d t (19)
subject to the second social planner’s optimization
{xˆ, yˆ}∞T = arg max
{x,y}∞T
∫ ∞
T
(
U(x(t) + y(t))− b(I)y(t)− V˜ x(t)
)
e−rt d t (20)
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(T ) = S
Call the current social planner’s welfare from T onwards G1. Under certainty with
V˜ = v it is equivalent to the social welfare described in section (3), so G1(S, b(I), v, v) =
G(S, b(I), v). Call the optimized value function of the second social planner in (19)
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G2. When V = v, the evaluations of the successive social planner’s coincide and G2 =
G1(S, b(I), v, V = v). Note that extraction xˆ and renewable energy production yˆ after
T are based on the realized V˜ , not v. From the current social planner’s viewpoint the
future extraction path is therefore not optimal (except in the case V = v).
3.2 Analysis of political uncertainty
The social planner incurs a loss from not choosing extraction and investment in the
second period t > T . Denote this loss by
L(S, b(I), V, v) = G(S, b(I), v)−G1(S, b(I), V, v) ≥ 0 .
Equation (17) now reads
max
S,I
g(S)− I +G(S, b(I), v)− EL(S, b(I), V˜ , v) .
The ﬁrst order conditions are
gs +GS(S, b(I), v)− ELS(S, b(I), V˜ , v) = 0 (21)
−1 +Gb(S, b(I), v)b′ − ELb(S, b(I), V˜ , v)b′ = 0 . (22)
Under certainty, there is no loss and the last terms in (21) and (22) disappear. So the
eﬀect of introducing uncertainty takes the form
dS =
1
|M|
−︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Gbb(b
′)2 +Gb(b
′′)
) +︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ELS)−
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(GSbb
′)
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(b′ELb) (23)
d I =
1
|M| (gSS +GSS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(b′ELb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− (ELS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(GSbb
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(24)
The eﬀect of political uncertainty depends on the signs of ELS and ELb. Those signs
cannot be determined analytically. I therefore simulate the loss function derivatives to
ﬁnd a robust best guess. The simulations suggest that ELb < 0 and ELS > 0.
5 As in
the case of scientiﬁc uncertainty the signs of dS and d I are ambiguous.
There is one important diﬀerence between political and scientiﬁc uncertainty how-
ever. Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions in (11) and (12) with (23) and (24), we see
5The details are laid out in the Appendix B. Note that while this is by far the most frequent result,
parametrizations can be found that yield diﬀerent outcomes, in particular for the quadratic utility
function.
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that the two uncertainty types have opposite eﬀects on the ﬁrst order conditions:
gs +GS(S, b(I), v)
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
−ELS = 0 (political uncertainty)
gs +GS(S, b(I), v) +ω︸︷︷︸
+
= 0 (scientiﬁc uncertainty)
−1 +Gb(S, b(I), v)b′
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
−ELbb′ = 0 (political uncertainty)
−1 +Gb(S, b(I), v)b′−ξb′︸︷︷︸
+
= 0 (scientiﬁc uncertainty)
However, that does not translate into eﬀects on dS and d I going opposite directions.
Without further assumptions the relative magnitudes of ELS versus ω and ELb versus ξ
cannot be determined. If they had similar magnitudes, we could conclude that the two
types of uncertainty has opposing eﬀects on investment and early extraction, all else
equal. But they are two diﬀerent concepts and hence cannot easily be compared.
3.3 Special cases: Exogenous investment and extraction
To gain intuition about the result above, suppose investment is exogenous. Then equa-
tion (21) alone determines the impact of uncertainty on S. For the case that ELS > 0
more is extracted earlier:
dS =
ELS
gSS(S) +GSS(S, b(I¯))
< 0 .
Secondly, when extraction is exogenous, less is invested in renewable energy technology
(from equation 22):
d I =
ELbb
′
Gbb(b′)2 +Gb(b′′)
< 0
Intuitively, the current social planner wants to reduce the future social planner’s possi-
bility to deviate from the choices she would have made in the second period. She cannot
control how her investments in renewable energy technology and the fossil resource6 are
used in the future, so she invests less. If the extraction and the investment decision are
made jointly, the same type of interaction eﬀects described in section 2.3 are present:
Political uncertainty makes investments less attractive. That increases the incentive
to save fossil resources for the future, counteracting the eﬀect uncertainty has on the
extraction decision.
Comparing the present result to those in section 2.3, I ﬁnd that scientiﬁc and political
uncertainty have opposing eﬀects on investment in renewable energy technology and
6We can think of the decision to “not extract” as “investment” in the resource stock.
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extraction of fossil fuels when either of them is exogenous.
4 Market solution
So far, the problem was cast in terms of one or two social planners. Now I reformulate
it as a decentralized market problem. A regulator sets emission taxes and chooses an
R&D policy. I assume that ﬁrst best R&D policy is possible. Such a policy optimally
compensates for the common market failures in R&D markets. That is equivalent to the
government directly investing and subsequently making the technology freely available.
The owners of the non-renewable resource extract x(t) in [0, T ] knowing the emission
tax q(t). They plan given their expectations about the carbon tax Q˜(t) for [T,∞]. The
source of uncertainty is irrelevant for them. From T onwards, they optimize extraction
for known Q(t) and b(I). Hence the optimization problem may be formulated as
max
S
h(S, q) + EH(S, Q˜) (25)
where
h(S, q) =max
{x}T0
∫ T
0
(p(t)− q)x(t)e−rt d t (26)
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(0) given, R(T ) = S
H(S,Q) =max
{x}∞T
∫ ∞
T
(p(t)−Q)x(t)e−rt d t (27)
s.t. R˙(t) = −x(t), R(T ) = S
From T on, the renewable substitute producers decide how much energy y(t) to provide.
They will supply nothing if the price is below b(I) and oﬀer renewable energy competi-
tively as soon as it reaches their marginal cost p(t) = b(I). Demand is derived from U
and market clearing requires that U ′(·) = p(t) ∀t.
4.1 Scientiﬁc uncertainty
In the period [0, T ], the social welfare maximizing regulator set the carbon tax q(t) and
chooses how much to invest I, given her expectations about climate damages Ev˜. At T ,
she re-optimizes after learning her true evaluation v and sets the tax Q(t). Technically,
the regulator can implement the social planner solution if she can imitate the ﬁrst
order conditions for the social planner optimum for some choice of taxes q(t), Q(t). In
particular, the taxes must equalize the shadow price of the fossil resource for the market
and the social planner such that the extraction paths both before and after T coincide.
For t < T , q = Ev˜ equalizes the ﬁrst order conditions (for a given S). The complete
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equations can be found in Appendix A. Similarly, for t > T setting Q = v aligns market
and social planner ﬁrst order conditions (for given S and I). As the derivative of the
value function equals the shadow price of the resource we get that also the ﬁrst oder
condition for the choice of S is the same (from equation 11):
hS(S, q) = gS(S) = −λ(T )
HS(S,Q) = G(S, b(I), v) = μ(T )
λ(T ) = Eμ(T ) = EHS(S,Q) = GS(S, b(I),Ev˜) + ω . (28)
Hence S is chosen socially optimal by the market too. Finally, given socially optimal
extraction is replicated, it is also optimal for the regulator to invest the same amount
I in green technology as the social planner. Thus, not surprisingly, the social plan-
ner optimum is achieved by setting the carbon taxes equal to the (expected) marginal
damages.
4.2 Political uncertainty
The second regulator sets the carbon tax Q(t) for t > T after learning his valuation V .
The problem of the second regulator is identical to the problem for the regulator under
scientiﬁc uncertainty for t > T (equation 27). Hence analogously to the just described
result in 4.1, he sets Q = V for any given S and I.
The regulator prior to T then chooses investment I and sets the carbon tax q(t).
She expects the future carbon tax to be EQ = EV = v. Can the ﬁrst social planner’s
solution be implemented by a ﬁxed q? Under scientiﬁc uncertainty it is possible to align
the market to the social optimum by setting q = Ev˜. Also for political uncertainty, this
tax level is the only candidate, because both in the market and in social optimum the
Hotelling rule must hold:
p(t) = Ev˜ + (p(0)− v)ert .
To achieve the social optimal price path slope in a market setting by a ﬁxed tax, the
tax must hence equal the marginal damage, q = v ∀ t.
Under scientiﬁc uncertainty, at time T the market and social planner shadow price
both are GS(S, b(I),Ev˜) + ω (equation 28). Under political uncertainty the resource
owner also has this shadow price because the second regulator behaves just like the
regulator under scientiﬁc uncertainty. But the ﬁrst period social planner under political
uncertainty has a diﬀerent shadow price at time T :
λ(T ) = EGS(S, b(I), v) = GS(S, b(I),Ev˜)− ELS(S, b(I), V˜ , v).
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We know that ω > 0 > −ELS, which is the central diﬀerence between scientiﬁc and
analytical uncertainty (see section 3.2). Hence at t = T , q = v is not possible and a
ﬁxed carbon tax is not suﬃcent to achieve the socially desirable outcome.
The regulator however can implement the social planner solution by a variable carbon
tax q(t). The social planner price path for t < T is given by
pS(t) = v + λS(T )er(t−T ) ,
while the market price is given by
pM(t) = q(t) + λM(T )er(t−T ) .
The regulator sets the tax q(t) to recreate the social planner price path:
pM(t) = pS(t) for t ∈ [0, T ]
q(t) = v − (λM(T )− λS(T ))er(t−T ) . (29)
The shadow prices of the resource in T diﬀer:
λS(T ) = GS(S, b(I),Ev˜)− ELS(S, b(I), V˜ , v)
λM(T ) = GS(S, b(I),Ev˜) + ω .
Given that ω > 0 > ELS, the resource owners have a higher shadow value than the
social planner, λS(T ) < λM(T ). This is intuitive: The market actor is indiﬀerent to
the source of uncertainty, whereas the social planner puts a negative value on losing
contol over future taxes. It follows directly from equation (29) and the observation that
(λM(T )− λS(T ))er(t−T ) increases in time that
q(t) < v ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
q˙(t) < 0 .
The optimal carbon tax under political uncertainty is lower than the marginal climate
damage, and it decreases over time.
5 Conclusion
I use a dynamic model of a stylized energy market to investigate how uncertainty about
future carbon taxes inﬂuences investment in renewable energy technology and extraction
of exhaustible fossil fuels. I distinguish between two types of uncertainty: Scientiﬁc
uncertainty, caused by a lack of knowledge about the climate system, and uncertainty
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about political decision making in the future.
When extraction of fossil fuels and investment in renewable energy technology are
investigated separately, scientiﬁc uncertainty leads to more cautious behavior in the
common sense: less is extracted awaiting the resolution of uncertainty, and more is
invested in renewable energy technology. For political uncertainty, I get the opposite
result: more is extracted and less invested. An intuitive explanation of this result is
that these decisions give the future decision maker less room to maneuver. The main
result of this study is that the eﬀects are inconclusive when extraction and investment
are treated jointly. The interaction eﬀects counteract the direct eﬀects observed in the
analysis with exogenous investment or extraction. Increasing investment in the future
ceteris paribus leads to an incentive to extract more of the resource today. So when
scientiﬁc uncertainty increases the incentive to invest, this counteracts the incentive to
extract less. The total eﬀect depends on the speciﬁc situation.
In the case of scientiﬁc uncertainty a constant carbon tax equaling the marginal
damages suﬃces to implement the social optimum. With political uncertainty, such
a tax does not lead to the outcome desired by the social planner in the ﬁrst period.
Instead a carbon tax lower than the marginal damages and decreasing over time aligns
the resource owners proﬁt motive with the social objective of the social planner.
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Appendix
A Additional calculations
A.1 Optimality conditions social planner
Below I present the optimality conditions used in the main text from the social planner
problem. For g (equation (2)), the Hamiltonian and the optimality conditions from the
maximum principle are
Ht<T = U (xt)− vxt − λtxt
U ′ (xt)− Ev˜ = λt
λ˙t − rλt = 0
As we have a ﬁxed terminal state, we have R(t) = S and no additional transversality
condition. Similarly, for G (equation (6)) we have
Ht>T = U (xt + yt)− b(I)yt −Qxt − μtxt
U ′ (xt + yt) = V + μt
U ′ (xt + yt) = b(I)
μ˙t − rμt = 0
So xt and yt are never supplied at the same time (as b(I) constant). If Q > b it must be
the case that S = 0, and no extraction takes place after T . Otherwise, S is extracted
completely before the substitute is produced. The maximum price to be achieved from
the renewable resource is b(I). The maximum shadow value of the resource is therefore
μτ = b(I)−Q. The shadow value increasses at the discount rate
μt = (b(I)− V )e−r(τ−t)
For the value function being diﬀerentiable, the adjoint variable serves as a shadow value
gS = −λ(T )
GS = μ(T ) = (b(I)−Q)e−r(τ−T ) > 0
For scientiﬁc uncertainty, the ﬁrst order condition (4) implies
gS + EGS = 0
λ(T ) = Eμ(T )
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This describes the optimal solution under scientiﬁc uncertainty. For political uncer-
tainty, the ﬁrst social planner’s extraction problem is solved like Ht<T and the second
social planner’s problem like HT>t.
To ﬁnd Gb, ﬁrst note that renewable energy yt will only be supplied from τ onwards,
when fossil fuel is exhausted. Rewriting the optimization slightly and making use of the
envelope theorem Gb is
G(S, b(I), V ) =max
xt,yt
∫ τ
T
e−rt [U (xt)− V xt] d t+
∫ ∞
τ
e−rt [U (yt)− b(I)yt] d t
=max
xt
{∫ τ
T
e−rt [U (xt)− V xt] d t + e−rτmaxyt [U (yt)− b(I)yt]
r
}
Gb =− e−rτ yr < 0
To conﬁrm that GSb > 0, I take the derivative with respect to b
GSb =
∂μT
∂b
= b(I)′e−r(τ−T ) − r(b(I)− V )e−r(τ−T )τb
To determine τb, replace μt in the ﬁrst order conditions so that
U ′(x∗(t))− V = (b(I)− V )e−r(τ−t)
This equality together with ∫ τ
T
x∗(t) d t = S
implicitly deﬁnes x∗(S, I, V, t) and τ(S, I, V ). Diﬀerentiating both equations yields
x∗b(t) =
1
U ′′
(1− r(b(I)− V )τb)e−r(τ−t)∫ τ
T
x∗b(t) d t+ x
∗(τ)τb = 0
Inserting for x∗b∫ τ
T
1
U ′′
(1− r(b(I)− V )τb)e−r(τ−t) d t+ x∗(τ)τb = 0∫ τ
T
1
U ′′
e−r(τ−t) d t− r(b(I)− V )τb
∫ τ
T
1
U ′′
e−r(τ−t) d t+ x∗(τ)τb = 0
τb =
∫ τ
T
1
U ′′
e−r(τ−t) d t
r(b(I)− V ) ∫ τ
T
1
U ′′
e−r(τ−t) d t− x∗(τ) > 0
So GSb is positive.
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A.2 Optimality conditions market
For the fossil fuel owners in the market, the optimality conditions for t < T are
hS(S, q) = −EHS(S, Q˜)
p(t) = q + λ(t) ∀ t < T
λ(t) = λ(0)ert∫ T
0
x(t) d t = R(0)− S
And for T > t
p(t) = Q + μ(t) ∀ t ≥ T
μ(t) = μ(0)ert∫ τ
T
x(t) d t = S
By visual inspection one can verify the results presented in the main text: Constant
carbon taxes q = Ev˜ and Q = v align the market with the social optimum under
scientiﬁc uncertainty. The main text shows that political uncertainty requires a time
varied carbon tax.
B Simulations
I employ three common functional forms for utility (social welfare) functions: quadratic,
logarithmic and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
B.1 Analytical results
For given S and I, the optimal solution G for [T,∞] is found from the ﬁrst order
conditions. Generally τ is determined by the equation∫ τ
T
[U ′]−1 (v + (b− v)e−r(τ−t)) d t = S .
Quadratic utility
For a quadratic utility function U(x) = x− α
2
x2, I have
∫ τ
T
1
α
(
v + (b− v)e−r(τ−t)) d t = S
(b− v) (1− e−r(τ−T ))+ r(v − 1)(τ − T ) = −rαS .
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Figure 1: Quadratic utility function. Graphs for Gb and GS that show convex-
ity/concavity in left panel. Loss function over b in right panel, showing both Lb > 0
and Lb < 0 for same parameter values for S, v, V .
This equation cannot be solved for τ by standard algebra.
Logarithmic utility
For a logarithmic utility function U(x) = log(x), τ is to be found from∫ τ
T
(
v + (b− v)e−r(τ−t))−1 d t = S
τ − T
v
− 1
rv
(
log b− log [e−r(τ−T )(b− v) + v]) = S
τ =
log
[
erT − berT
v
+ be
rT+rSv
v
]
r
Thus the derivatives are
Gbvv =
e−rT
(−2 + erSv (2 + rSv(−2 + rSv)− brS (2 + rSv + erSv(−2 + rSv))))
r (b (−1 + erSv) + v)3
GSvv =
1
(b (−1 + erSv) + v)3 ×
ber(−T+Sv)
{
r2S2v3 + b2rS
(
2 + rSv + erSv(−2 + rSv))
−b (erSv(2 + rSv(−4 + rSv)) + 2(−1 + rSv(1 + rSv)))}
CRRA utility
For a CRRA utility function U(x) = x1−ρ
1−ρ∫ τ
T
(
v + (b− v)e−r(τ−t))− 1ρ d t = S .
This integral has no analytic solution.
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Figure 2: Logarithmic utility function, derivatives Gb and GS in left panel. Loss function
over b in right panel exhibits both Lb > 0 and Lb < 0 for one set of values S, v, V .
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Figure 3: Derivatives of dG/ d b and dG/ dS for a CRRA social welfare function with
a risk aversion parameter of ρ = 2 and values S = 190, b = 2.71.
B.2 Numerical results
I proceed by numerically solving for Gbvv, GSvv, Lb and LS.
7 I use a grid of twenty
diﬀerent values for each of b, S, v, V . The derivatives of interest are analyzed in two
ways: by visual inspection of the plots of GS and Gb over v and L over S and b, and by
rough numerical appoximations of the derivatives by the formulas8
f ′(z) ≈ f(z)− f(z−1)
z − z−1
f ′′(z) ≈ f(z+1)− 2f(z) + f(z−1
(.5(z − z−1))2 .
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Figure 4: Loss function and current government value function under uncertainty for a
CRRA utility function with ρ = 2 over cost b and stock S respectively.
Table 1:
min max
S 105 200
b .515 .99
v, V .03 .505
Quadratic
I use three values for α: .005, .02 and .1. The values for the other parameters are found
in Table 1. Note that to have a well formulated problem, I need α < 1 and b < 1. The
results are inconclusive. For α = .02, the numerical derivations suggest that GbQQ > 0
and GSQQ > 0. The derivatives of the loss function Lb and LS take both positive and
negative values, for constant S, b and v. The same qualitative results are achieved for
α = .005.
Log
I use the parameter values as for the quadratic utility function (Table 1). The numerical
derivatives indicate GSvv > 0, Gbvv < 0. There are some exemptions for Gbvv, but those
are small values and a look at the graph indicates that those may be numerical errors,
as the graph looks like a straight line, suggesting Gbvv = 0. The loss function derivative
LS is positive, while Lb switches sign.
CRRA
I solve the model for the standard consumption smoothing value in the literature ρ = 2.
I also employ ρ = .5 and ρ = 5. The range of values for the other parameters is found
7The numerical work is undertaken in MATLAB. The code is made available upon request.
8Note that the grid points are evenly spaced.
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Table 2:
min max
S 100 200
b 2.51 3.51
v, V 1 2
in Table 2. For all three values of ρ, and all possible combinations of parameter values
in Table 2, I get that GSvv > 0, GBvv < 0, LS > 0, Lb < 0.
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Chapter III
Growth Uncertainty in the Integrated Assessment
of Climate Change (w. Christian Traeger)
Abstract
Integrated assessments of climate change commonly rely on the assumption that tech-
nological progress outgrows climate change damages by an order of magnitude, even
without any climate policy. Then, mitigating greenhouse gases is a redistribution from
the poor present to a rich future. While we have experienced enormous growth over
the last century, sustaining such growth over several more centuries is by no means a
sure thing. We analyze the consequences of growth uncertainty on optimal abatement
policies in an integrated assessment model (IAM) that was recently employed to de-
termine the US federal social cost of carbon (SCC). For this purpose, we rebuild the
IAM as a recursive-dynamic programming model and solve the non-linear, out-of-steady
state problem. This approach diﬀers largely from current state of the art Monte-Carlo
simulations. We expose the rate of technological progress to iid and persistent shocks,
both of which have permanent eﬀects on the technology level in the economy. As is well
known, the standard economic model fails to capture risk premia and discount rates
correctly at the same time (equity premium and risk free-rate puzzle). We therefore an-
alyze the problem as well for recursive preferences that resolve the equity premium and
the risk-free rate puzzle by disentangling risk aversion from the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. We ﬁnd that the impact of risk becomes signiﬁcant when modeling
comprehensive risk preference and/or persistent growth shocks. The sign of the eﬀect
of growth uncertainty on mitigation depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution. The analysis also yields an interesting insight into precautionary savings with
two capital stocks, man-made and environmental.
Keywords
climate change, uncertainty, integrated assessment, growth, risk aversion, intertemporal
substitution, recursive utility, dynamic programming, DICE
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1 Introduction
Future economic growth is of ﬁrst order importance for climate change evaluation. Ex-
trapolating economic growth from the past century to the coming centuries makes green-
house gas mitigation a redistribution from the present poor to the future rich. For ex-
ample, even in the absence of any climate change policy, Nordhaus’s (2008) widespread
DICE-2007 model implies that generations living 100 years from now are ﬁve times richer
than today’s generation. We analyze how uncertainty about economic growth aﬀects
optimal climate policy. We model fundamental uncertainty about technological progress
that is independent of climatic change. Alternatively, the growth uncertainty can also
be interpreted as a consequence of economic crises, social unrest, or diverging global
growth rates, as long as these sources of uncertainty are exogenous to climatic change.
We do not model a direct impact of climate change on economic growth. While such a
direct link would have a major impact on economic policy, this direct link is empirically
more controversial than the fundamental growth uncertainty we depict. Our paper is the
ﬁrst to consistently analyze how growth uncertainty impacts optimal climate policies in
the integrated assessment of climate change. We focus on optimal abatement eﬀort and
the optimal carbon tax. We employ a recursive dynamic programming version of the
DICE-2007 model by Nordhaus (2008). The model is the most widespread integrated
assessment model and was recently used as one of three models determining the US
federal social cost of carbon.
It is widely known that the standard economic model is not able to simultaneously
capture observed risk premia and discount rates. Agents tend to have a much higher
willingness to pay for risk avoidance that the usual parameterizations of the standard
model suggest (equity premium puzzle). If we increase risk aversion in the standard
model we simultaneously increases aversion to intertemporal substitution. In conse-
quence, the risk-free discount rate takes on unreasonably high values. An important
branch of the ﬁnance literature resolves this puzzle by introducing Epstein-Zin-Weil
preferences in combination with persistent shocks (Epstein and Zin, 1991; Weil, 1990;
Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio, 2003; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Bansal et al., 2010;
Nakamura et al., 2010). Epstein-Zin-Weil prefences disentangle risk attitude from the
propensity to smooth consumption over time. Indeed, there is no a priori reason why
these quite diﬀerent preferences should coincide. Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences also sat-
isfy typical normative desiderata including time consistency and the von Neumman-
Morgenstern axioms (Traeger, 2010). We therefore analyze the implication of uncer-
tainty under standard preferences as well as under general estimates taken from the
ﬁnance literature that suggest a higher coeﬃcient of risk aversion and a lower propen-
sity to smooth consumption over time.
In an analytic model, Traeger (2010) shows that growth uncertainty can have a
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major impact on the social discount rate under Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. He also
points out the relation of the general question to the precautionary savings literature.
His paper does not explicitly distinguish between capital and environmental investment
(greenhouse gas mitigation). As we show, these two investment possibilities can react
to uncertainty in opposite directions. Hence, our paper is also a contribution to the
precautionary savings literature, analyzing two assets that diﬀer in their depreciation
rate and their consumption impact. In a semi-analytic paper, with a four period numeric
example Ha-Duong and Treich (2004) analyze Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences in the case
of damage uncertainty with two states of the world. Crost and Traeger (2010) employ
Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences in a recursive version of DICE to evaluate damages. They
point out that disentanglement is of major importance for long-term evaluation because
of getting the risk-free discount rate right. However, in the damage context, they show
that risk aversion itself plays no role for evaluation. We show that for growth uncertainty,
risk aversion is a major determinant of optimal climate policy. Moreover, under growth
uncertainty, the sign of the risk eﬀect depends on the estimate for propensity to smooth
consumption over time. Recursive implementations of DICE include the work of Kelly
and Kolstad (1999) and Leach (2007) who analyze learning about climate sensitivity,
and Lemoine and Traeger (2010) who analyze the policy impact of tipping points in the
climate system. Karp and Zhang (2006) discuss learning about climate sensitivity and
marginal abatement cost in a stylized linear quadratic model. More remotely related
are the non-recursive models that analyze uncertainty or Monte-Carlo approximations
to uncertainty for DICE (Nordhaus, 2008; Ackerman et al., 2010), for FUND (Anthoﬀ
and Tol, 2010), for MERGE (Richels et al., 2004), for WITCH Cian and Tavoni (2011),
and for PAGE (Hope, 2006). The drawback of simultaneous methods or forward control
models is that the uncertainty we are modeling in this paper would be infeasible to
handle because the uncertainty tree would explode quickly (even with a ﬁnite time
horizon). Monte-Carlo simulation can take up more uncertainty, but cannot properly
model optimal decision making under uncertainty and are strictly speaking closer to a
sensitivity analysis. Baker and Shittu (2007) give a survey of literature that incorporates
uncertainty into the analysis of technical change in the climate change context.
2 Model and welfare speciﬁcation
Integrated assessment models embed a model of the world economy in a model of the
climate system to investigate their interactions. We build a recursive version of the
DICE-2007 model, with some minor simpliﬁcations.1 Our model is summarized graphi-
1In order to avoid the “curse of dimensionality” in our inﬁnite horizon dynamic programming version
of DICE, we replace the three carbon sinks in DICE by single decay rate ﬁt, and we simplify the equation
of motions for temperatures, see Appendix A). The simpliﬁed model is calibrated to perfectly ﬁt the
baseline policies in DICE, but temperatures are slightly lower than in the original model.
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Figure 1: is an abstract representation of the climate-enriched economy model. The
control variables consumption and abatement as well as the ‘residual’ investment are
represented by dashed rectangles. The main state variables are depicted by solid rect-
angles. The green color indicates that the technology level is uncertain.
cally in Figure 1. The world economy is described by a classical Ramsey growth model.
Capital accumulation is endogenous, while labor and technological growth are exoge-
nous. Production of an aggregate commodity causes emissions that accumulate in the
atmosphere. The social planner can spend part of the production on emission reduc-
tions (abatement). The emission stock in the atmosphere causes global warming and
this warming is subject to exogenously parameterized feedback processes. An increase
of global average temperature above pre-industrial levels causes damages that reduce
world output. We solve for the optimal investment and abatement decisions.
2.1 Growth Uncertainty
Uncertainty impacts the exogenous rate of technological progress. The technology level
in the economy enters the Cobb-Douglas production function and determines the overall
productivity of the economy.2 A shock in the growth rate has a permanent eﬀect on
the technology level in the economy. This assumption diﬀers from the most widespread
shocks in the real business cycle literature that simply aﬀect the technology level within
a period and have no long lasting eﬀects. Such non-persistent shocks of the technology
level are of little interest to our research question that is concerned with uncertainty
about the long-term productivity of the economy. The technology level At in the econ-
omy follows the equation of motion
A˜t+1 = At exp [g˜A,t] with g˜A,t = gA,0 ∗ exp [−δAt] + z˜t . (1)
The deterministic part of the stochastic growth rate g˜A,t decreases over time at rate
δA as in the original DICE-2007 model. We add a stochastic shock z˜, which is either
iid or persistent. Figure 2 shows the growth under certainty (z˜t = 0) in solid. Then,
productivity increases roughly threefold over the 100 year time horizon.
2Given the Cobb Douglas production function the model is independent of whether technological
progress aﬀects labor productivity, capital productivity, or, as modeled by Nordhaus, overall productiv-
ity. We use labor augmenting technological progress, which seems to be the more widespread notation
because for general production function only labor augmenting technological progress leads to a bal-
anced growth path.
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Figure 2: shows the expected draw and the 95% conﬁdence intervals for technology time
paths based on 1000 random draws of technology shock z˜ time paths with σz˜ = 2 ∗ gA,0.
The black dotted lines correspond to iid shocks while the dashed blue lines give the
conﬁcence interval in the case where the shock has a persistent coponent.
Our ﬁrst set of simulations analyzes the consequences of a shock that is identically
and independently distributed with
z˜t ∼ N (μz, σ2z) .
We set the standard deviation at twice the initial growth rate (σz = 2∗gA,0 ≈ 0.026). We
base this value on Kocherlakota’s (1996) observation for the last century of US data that
the standard deviation of consumption growth is about twice its expected value. The
rate of technological progress drives consumption growth in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
economy and, hence, we take a standard deviation of twice initial technology growth as a
good proxy for a reasonable order of magnitude.3 We ﬁx the mean of the growth shock so
that t+1 expectations for the technology level coincide with those under certainty.4 The
dotted lines in Figure 2 give the 95% (simulated) conﬁdence intervall for the technology
levels over the next 100 years under our assumptions about the growth shocks. We
emphasize that we model a non-mean reverting random walk. This speciﬁcation makes
the numerical implication signiﬁcantly more challenging. However, given our concern is
uncertainty about long-run productivity we avoid the assumption of mean-reversion.
Our second set of simulation analyzes the consequences of a shock that has a persis-
tent component. Persistent shocks are usually part of the ﬁnance literature explaining
3Our decision maker can smooth the eﬀect of technology shocks using capital to smooth consumption.
Moreover the steady state consumption growth rate also depends on deterministic population growth.
Thus, our model is not build to reproduce or calibrate consumption ﬂuctuations. We merely take the
above reasoning as a proxy for a relevant order of magnitude.
4A mean zero shock of the growth rate would, by Jensen’s inequality, imply an increase in the
expected next period technology level. The technology level in period t + 1 is determined by the
random variable exp[z˜] that is lognormally distributed. Setting E[z˜] = −σ2(z˜)/2 implies E exp[z˜] = 1
and that the expected technology level equals its deterministic part.
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the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzle (Bansal and Yaron, 2004). Here, we
think of the persistent shock as a more fundamental uncertain change in technological
progress and economic productivity. The theoretical literature has established that per-
sistent shocks imply decreasing social discount rates over time (Weitzman, 2009) We
model persistence in form of an AR(1) process
z˜t = x˜t + y˜t where (2)
x˜t ∼ N (μx, σ2x) and
y˜t = ζyt−1 + ˜t with ˜t ∼ N (μ, σ2 ) .
We choose the standard deviations to σx = σ =
√
2 ∗ gA,0, which again results in a
standard deviation of the overall shock z˜t determining the next period technology level
of twice the initial growth rate: σz = 2 ∗ gA,0. Our second speciﬁcation coincides with
the ﬁrst in the case of vanishing persistence ζ = 0. A higher persistence increases long-
run uncertainty in the second scenario. The mean values are chosen such that at the
beginning of the planning horizon the expected path for the technology level equals the
certain path for y0 = 0.
5 Our simulations use a persistence of ζ = 0.5, implying that
50% of the -shock carries over to the growth rate in the next year. While modeling
an even higher persistence would be desirable, modeling a random walk in the growth
rate (instead of a mean reverting process) is a serious numerical challenge in an inﬁnite
horizon dynamic programming problem. Persistence of the shock adds signiﬁcantly to
this challenge. We will show that even the rather moderate persistence has strong
implications for optimal climate policy.
2.2 Welfare and Bellman equation
The decision maker maximizes her value function subject to the constraints imposed
by the climate-enriched economy. We formulate the decision problem recursively us-
ing the Bellman equation. This recursive structure facilitates the proper treatment of
uncertainty and the incorporation of comprehensive risk preferences. The relevant phys-
ical state variables describing the system are capital Kt, atmospheric carbon Mt, and
technology level At. In addition time t is a state variable that captures exogenous pro-
cesses including population growth, changes in abatement costs, non-industrial GHG
emissions, and temperature feedback processes. Finally, in the case of persistent shocks,
the state dt captures the persistent part of last period’s shock that carries over to the
current period. We ﬁrst state the Bellman equation for standard preferences, i.e., the
5A short calculation shows that we achieve this equivalence by setting E[x˜] = E[˜] = −σ2(x˜)/2.
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time additive expected utility model:
V (Kt,Mt, At, t, dt) = max
Ct,μt
Lt
(
Ct
Lt
)1−ηˆ
1− ηˆ (3)
+ exp[−δu]E
[
V (Kt+1,Mt+1, A˜t+1, t + 1, d˜t+1)
]
.
The value function V represents the maximal welfare the can be obtained given the
current state of the system. Utility within a period corresponds to the ﬁrst term on
the right hand side of the dynamic programming equation (3). It is a population (Lt)
weighted power function of global per capita consumption (Ct/Lt). The parameter ηˆ
captures two preferences: the desire to smooth consumption over time and Arrow-Pratt
relative risk aversion. Following Nordhaus (2008), we set ηˆ = 2. The second term on
the right hand side of equation (3) represents the maximally achievable welfare from
period t + 1 on, given the new states of the system in period t + 1, which follow from
the equations of motion summarized in Appendix A. The planner discounts next period
welfare at the rate of pure time preference δu1.5% (also utility discount rate), where the
value is again chosen to coincide with Nordhaus’s (2008) DICE-2007 model. In period t,
uncertainty governs the realization of next period’s technology level A˜t+1 and, thus, gross
production. Therefore, the decision maker take expectations when he choses the optimal
control variables consumption Ct and abatement (emission control rate) μt. Equation
(3) states that the value of an optimal consumption path starting in period t should
be the maximal sum of the instantaneous utility gained in that period and the welfare
gained from the continuation path. The control Ct balances immediate consumption
gratiﬁcation with the value of future capital stock. The control μt balances immediate
consumption (given up for abatement) against the future stock of carbon.
Next we enrich the model to capture a comprehensive risk attitude that can simulta-
neously capture observed risk-free discount rates and equity premia. Hereto, we exploit
the recursive structure disentangle risk and time preferences. The standard model forces
these two a priori distinct attitudes to coincide. Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990)
show how to disentangle the two and Bansal and Yaron (2004) showed how this disentan-
gled approach resolves the risk-free rate and the equity premium puzzles. We emphasize
that the model satisﬁes time consistency and the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
axioms and is normatively no less desirable than the standard discounted expected util-
ity model (Traeger, 2010). The latter paper also shows how to shift the non-linearity
from the time-step as in Epstein and Zin (1989) to uncertainty aggregation, resulting in
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the Bellman equation
V (Kt,Mt, At, t, dt) = max
Ct,μt
Lt
(
Ct
Lt
)1−η
1− η (4)
+
exp[−δu]
1− η
(
E
[
(1− η)V (Kt+1,Mt+1, A˜t+1, t+ 1, d˜t+1)
] 1−RRA
1−η
) 1−η
1−RRA
.
The parameter η captures the desire to smooth consumption over time (aversion to
intertemporal substitution). It is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution. The parameter RRA depicts the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
In the case η = RRA we are back in the standard model and equation (4) collapse to
equation (3). For a detailed analysis of the interpretation of the parameters RRA and ρ
we refer to Epstein and Zin (1989) and to Traeger (2010). We base our choices of values
for the disentangled preference on estimates by Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003),
Bansal and Yaron (2004), and Bansal et al. (2010). These papers suggest a best guesses
of η = 2
3
and of relative risk aversion in the proximity of the value RRA = 10 that we
adopt. The social cost of carbon in current value units of the consumption-capital good
as the ratio of the marginal value of a ton of carbon and the marginal value of a unit of
the consumption good SCCt =
∂MtV
∂KtV
.
2.3 Numerical Implementation
We give a short summary of the numeric implementation, discussing details of Appendix
B. We approximate the value function by Chebychev polynomials and solve the Bellman
equation by value function iteration. We represent the continuous distribution capturing
technological progress by Gauss-Legendre quadrature nodes. The Bellman equations (3)
and (4) are not convenient for a numerical implementation for two reasons. First, capital
and technology are subject to enormous growth and any value function approximation
with a reasonable number of nodes would be very coarse on the space.6 Second, modeling
a random walk without mean reversion is a major challenge and the Bellman equation
as cited above would not convergence with the amount of uncertainty we are capturing.
Therefore, we renormalize consumption and capital in per eﬀective labor units. For
the technology level, our state variable captures the deviation from the deterministic
evolution of technology. Finally, we map the inﬁnite time horizon on a [0, 1] interval.
We adjust the Bellman equation conveniently to these changes in the state variables and
control variables obtaining equation (6) in Appendix B.
6More precisely, the relevant part of the state space at diﬀerent times would be disconnected. Our
renormalization achieves that the relevant values lie in the same reduced region of the state space at
all times. That allows us to obtain a much better approximation of the value function with less nodes.
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3 Results
We ﬁrst discuss results for standard preferences and an iid shock. Then we increase the
disentangled coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to the value suggested in the ﬁnance
literature and, in a second step, introduce persistence in the growth shock. Finally,
we reduce propensity to smooth consumption over time to the degree suggested in the
ﬁnance literature for disentangled preference speciﬁcations.
3.1 Entangled standard preferences (η = RRA = 2)
Figure 3 compares the deterministically optimal climate policy with the case of an iid
shock on the rate of technological project, inducing a random walk of the technology
level. The shock in the growth rate is normally distributed with a standard deviation
of twice the initial growth rate (σz ≈ 0.026). With isoelastic entangled preferences
(RRA = η = 2), the iid shock has a very minor eﬀect on the optimal policies. For the
current century, the optimal abatement is .2-.6 percentage points higher under uncertain
than under certain growth. In addition, current investment goes up by .35% percentage
points. Hence, we ﬁnd a small precautionary savings eﬀect in both captial dimensions:
produced productive capital and natural capital in terms of a clean atmosphere.
The social discounting literature oﬀers an explanation for the economically insigniﬁ-
cant magnitude of the impact. Traeger (2012) points out that uncertainty in the Ramsey
discounting equation stemming from uncertain growth has a negligible impact on in-
tertemporal trade-oﬀs under the assumption of entangled preferences. He explains that
when the desire to smooth consumption coincides with the aversion to risk, the decision
maker is what he calls “intertemporal risk neutral”: Suppose the decision maker is in-
diﬀerent between two alternative consumption paths ﬂuctuating over time. From these
two paths, construct a “high” consumption path by picking the higher consumption out-
come in each period, and a “low” consumption path by picking the lower consumption
outcome in each period. The decision maker is intertemporal risk neutral if she is indif-
ferent between receiving either of the two original paths with certainty and receiving a
lottery with a 50/50 chance over the “high” and the “low” path (Traeger, 2012).
3.2 Increasing risk aversion to RRA = 10
The standard model does not accurately capture equity premia. The premia actual
agents pay for risk-reductions are higher than we can explain in a model where both
relative risk aversion and aversion to intertemporal substitution equal to 2. Increasing
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to RAA = 10 is a major step towards resolving
the equity premium puzzle. Increasing aversion to intertemporal substitution to the
same degree would result in ridiculously high consumption discount rates, defying all
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Figure 3: compares the optimal abatement rate and social cost of carbon under certainty
and iid uncertainty with standard preferences and RRA = η = 2.
empirical evidence. Hence, we have to employ the disentangling Bellman equation (4)
in order to capture the higher observed risk aversion.
Figure 4 shows the optimal climate policy under Epstein-Zin preferences that keep
η = 2 and increase Arrow-Pratt risk aversion to RRA = 10. We observe a modest
increase in abatement under uncertainty. Optimal abatement and the optimal social
cost of carbon are approximately 10 percent higher over the ﬁrst 100 years. The more
risk averse decision maker is more cautious, abating and investing more and consuming
less. Robustness checks (not shown) conﬁrm that these ﬁndings increase in the variance
of the stochastic shock. With Arrow-Pratt risk aversion exceeding the consumption
smoothing parameter (RRA = 10 > η = 2), the decision maker is now intertemporally
risk averse. This distaste of intertemporal uncertainty provokes precautionary savings.
To insure against falling short of expected growth, she invests more in manmade capital
and abates more to protect environmental capital. She raises both in roughly the same
proportions.
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Figure 4: compares the optimal abatement rate and social cost of carbon under certainty
and uncertainty with Epstein-Zin preferences, a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of
RRA = 10 and a coeﬃcient of aversion to intertemporal substitution of η = 2.
3.3 Persistence in growth shocks
The iid shock on technological growth makes the technology level essentially a random
walk. However, technological progress over the time span relevant to climate change
evaluation is intertemporally correlated. If the future will show that there are periods
where our current growth cannot be sustained, then the progress most likely does not
just fall behind for a single period. Similarly, if we are in a time of prosperous economic
and research progress, surrounding conditions and discoveries will most likely have last-
ing eﬀects on growth. Here, we model a relatively moderate persistence of growth shocks
according to equation (2). In addition to an iid shock component, the rate of technolog-
ical growth experiences a persistent shock whose impact on technological growth decays
by 50% per year.
The dotted lines in Figure 5 show the optimal climate policy under persistent growth
shocks. The dashed lines represent optimal policy in the setting without persistence,
but with the same growth uncertainty from one period to the next (which is slightly
higher here than in the previous section). Introducing persistence ampliﬁes the long-run
uncertainty, while keeping immediate uncertainty unchanged. The modeled persistence
approximately doubles the impact of uncertainty on optimal climate policy.
3.4 Decreasing consumption smoothing to η = 2/3
In the standard model ηˆ captures both relative risk aversion and aversion to intertempo-
ral consumption smoothing. Estimating both parameters separately in an Epstein-Zin
framework not only leads to a higher risk aversion parameter, but also to a lower aver-
sion to intertemporal consumption ﬂuctuation. We follow the empirical ﬁnance literature
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Figure 5: compares the optimal abatement rate and the social cost of carbon under
certainty, iid uncertainty and persistent uncertainty with persistence ζ = 0.5 for RRA =
10 and η = 2.
suggesting a best estimate of the consumption smoothing parameter of η = 2/3. Note
that a reduction of η immediately decreases the consumption discount rate, making
investment into the future more rewarding. This ﬁnding immediately relates to the
observed risk-free rate being signiﬁcantly lower than explained by the standard model
with ηˆ = 2. A reasoning by Nordhaus (2007) suggests that whenever we decrease η we
should increase the pure rate of time preference in order to keep the overall consump-
tion discount rate ﬁx. We emphasize that this reasoning would be wrong in the current
setting. Lowering η implies that we match the observed risk-free rate much better than
the standard model. On the other hand, the higher risk aversion parameter explains the
higher interest on risky assets, again better than in the standard model. In fact, the
empirical literature calibrating the Epstein-Zin model generally ﬁnds a lower pure time
preference than Nordhaus’s (2008) and our δu = 1.5% along the η = 2/3 and RAA = 10.
Given our focus on the eﬀects of uncertainty, however, we decided not to change pure
time preference with respect to DICE-2007 in this paper.
The solid lines in Figure 6 display the eﬀect of lowering η from 2 to 2/3 under cer-
tainty. The reduction in the parameter and, thus, the risk-free discount rate increases
optimal mitigation signiﬁcantly. The optimal carbon tax doubles and the optimal abate-
ment rate close to doubles. The decision maker is now less averse to shifting consumption
over time to increase aggregate welfare. Hence she evaluates the prospect of additional
welfare for the relatively aﬄuent generations in the future more positively than a deci-
sion maker with a higher aversion of η = 2. Introducing uncertainty into the model with
η = 2/3 and RRA = 10 decreases the optimal abatement and the social cost of carbon.
This ﬁnding is opposite to the eﬀects of uncertainty observed in the earlier settings.
Investment in manmade capital still increases (not shown).
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Figure 6: compares the optimal abatement rate and social cost of carbon under certainty
with two diﬀerent values for the consumption smoothing coeﬃcient, η = 2/3 and η = 2,
and uncertainty with Epstein-Zin preferences with RRA = 10 and η = 2/3.
The decision maker with η = 2/3 is relatively more willing to make up for consump-
tion losses due to high temperatures in times with lower temperatures. Introducing
uncertainty has two eﬀects. First, future income becomes uncertain reducing expected
future welfare. In general, this eﬀect induces a precautionary savings eﬀect under isoe-
lastic preferences (which satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion). However, because of
uncertainty in technological progress, also the future productivity of a saved consump-
tion unit becomes uncertain, making current consumption relatively more attractive.
This second eﬀect reduces the savings motive. Our numerical simulation shows that
overall investment into manmade goods still goes up under uncertainty, while consump-
tion stays almost constant and investment into the clean atmosphere decreases. Ap-
pendix C shows that, once more, persistence in the growth shock increases the growth
uncertainty eﬀect, further reducing optimal policy.
4 Conclusions
Extrapolating current growth into the future implies that climate policy is a redistri-
bution from a relatively poor present generation to far richer future generations. While
extrapolating recent growth might be the best guess, it is certainly not a sure prediction.
We analyze the implication of growth uncertainty on optimal climate policy. We trans-
late the DICE-2007 model of Nordhaus (2008) into a recursive dynamic programming
framework to consistently model stochastic growth. Our shocks on the rate of tech-
nological progress make the economy’s technology level a random walk. We ﬁnd that
a normally distributed shock in the growth rate has a rather small eﬀect on optimal
greenhouse gas abatement (fraction of a percentage point) and the optimal carbon tax.
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This insensitivity of the optimal policy to growth uncertainty results from the standard
model’s insensitivity to risk. The same phenomenon gives rise to the equity premium
(too low a risk premium) and the risk-free rate puzzle (too high a discount rate) in the
ﬁnance literature. To evaluate climate change under uncertainty, we acknowledge the
priomordial importance of getting the discount rate and the risk premium right: we fol-
low the approach suggested in the ﬁnance literature resolving the mentioned puzzles by
disentangling risk aversion from a decision maker’s propensity to smooth consumption
over time. The resulting model satisﬁes the same rationality constraints as the standard
discounted expected utility model, including time consistency.
Increasing relative risk aversion to the degrees measured in ﬁnance signiﬁcantly in-
creases optimal mitigation policies under uncertainty. Our iid shock on the rate of
technological growth increases optimal mitigation and the optimal carbon tax notably.
Introducing a moderate persistence to the shock doubles the uncertainty eﬀect on both
policy measures. However, the empirical ﬁndings in the ﬁnance literature using disen-
tangled Epstein-Zin preferences also suggest that the propensity to smooth consumption
over time is lower than the value in DICE-2007. Reducing this aversion to intertemporal
substitution turns the eﬀect of uncertainty on optimal climate policy on its head. Abate-
ment now decreases in response to uncertainty. However, it does so from an overall much
higher abatement level, because a lower aversion to intertemporal substitution decreases
the consumption discount rate and the overall mitigation eﬀort (under certainty) sig-
niﬁcantly. Thus, the fully disentangled model still results in a highest abatement rate,
but not because of uncertainty. It is merely a consequence of better capturing the low
risk-free discount rate.
The precautionary savings literature is well aware that a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution can result in a decrease in savings under uncertainty. Our model features
two diﬀerent investment possibilities. The natural capital has a somewhat complicated
intertemporal payoﬀ structure and investment is capped at the point of full abatement.
Our simulation show that investment into manmade capital increases under uncertainty
in all preference speciﬁcations. Only the eﬀect of uncertainty on investment into the
natural capital “clean atmosphere” turns around for the low aversion to intertempo-
ral substitution. Our paper employs observed preference speciﬁcations that are fully
rational. In the context of climate change, future wealth is the wealth consumed by
future generations not currently alive. Instead of employing observed preferences, we
could argue for the use of normative evaluation criteria. Then, equality of generation
over time would most likely play a prominent role. Our simulation, as well as straight
forward social discounting arguments, show how a low intergenerational substitutability
over time (high aversion) implies higher emissions under certainty. In this scenario,
uncertainty aversion has again a strong enhancing eﬀect on optimal mitigation eﬀorts.
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Appendix
A The climate enriched economy model
The following model is largely a reproduction of DICE-2007. The three most notable
diﬀerences are the annual time step (DICE-2007 features ten year time periods), the
inﬁnite time horizon, and the replacement of the carbon sink structure by a decay
rate. This simpliﬁcation is neccessary because each carbon sink would require an own
state variable in a recursive framework, which is computationally too costly. For a
detailed description of the procedure, see Lemoine and Traeger (2010). All parameters
are characterized and quantiﬁed in Table B on page 110.
Carbon in the atmosphere is accumulated according to
Mt+1 = Mpre + (Mt −Mpre) (1− δM(M, t)) + Et with
δM,t = δM,∞ + (δM,0 − δM,∞) exp[−δ∗M t] .
The stock of CO2 (Mt) exceeding preindustrial levels (Mpre) decays exponentially at the
rate δM(M, t). This decay rate falls exogenously over time to replicate the carbon cycle
in DICE-2007, mimicking that the ocean reservoirs reduce their uptake rate as they ﬁll
up (see Lemoine and Traeger, 2010). The variable Et characterizes yearly CO2 emissions,
consisting of industrial emissions and emissions from land use change an forestry Bt
Et = (1− μt)σtAtLtkκt +Bt .
Emissions from land use change and forestry fall exponentially over time
Bt = B0 exp[gB t] .
Industrial emissions are proportional to gross production AtLtk
κ
t . They can be reduced
by abatement. As in the DICE model, we in addition include an exogenously falling
rate of decarbonization of production σt
σt = σt−1 exp[gσ,t] with gσ,t = gσ,0 exp[−δσ t] .
The economy accumulates capital according to
kt+1 = [(1− δk) kt + yt − ct] exp[−(gA,t + gL,t)] ,
where δK denotes the depreciation rate, yt =
Yt
AtLt
denotes production net of abatement
costs and climate damage per eﬀective labor, and ct denotes aggregate global consump-
tion of produced commodities per eﬀective unit of labor. Population grows exogenously
by
Lt+1 = exp[gL,t]Lt with gL,t =
g∗L
L∞
L∞−L0
exp[g∗L t]− 1
.
78
Growth Uncertainty in IAMs
Here L0 denotes the initial and L∞ the asymptotic population. The parameter g
∗
L char-
acterizes the convergence from initial to asymptotic population. Technological progress
is exogenously given by equation (4) in section 2.1.
Net global GDP per eﬀective unit of labor is obtained from the gross product per
eﬀective unit of labor as follows
yτ =
1− Λ(μt)
1 +D(Tt)
kκt
where
Λ(μt) = Ψtμ
a2
t (5)
characterizes abatement costs as percent of GDP depending on the emission control rate
μt ∈ [0, 1]. The coeﬃcient of the abatement cost function Ψτ follows
Ψt =
σt
a2
a0
(
1− (1− exp[gΨ t])
a1
)
with a0 denoting the initial cost of the backstop, a1 denoting the ratio of initial over ﬁnal
backstop, and a2 denoting the cost exponent. The rate gΨ describes the convergence
from the initial to the ﬁnal cost of the backstop.
Climate damage as percent of world GDP depends on the temperature diﬀerence Tt
of current to preindustrial temperatures and is characterized by
D(Tt) = b1T
b2
t .
Nordhaus (2008) estimates b1 = 0.0028 and b2 = 2, implying a quadratic damage
function with a loss of 0.28% of global GDP at a 1 degree Celsius warming.
Temperature change Tt relative to pre-industrial levels is determined by a measure
for the CO2 equivalent greenhouse gas increase Φt, climate sensitivity s, and transient
feedback adjustments χt
Tt = s Φt χt .
In detail, climate sensitivity is
s =
λ1λ2 ln 2
1− feql ,
the measure of equivalent CO2 increase is
Φt =
ln(Mt/Mpre) + EFt/λ1
ln 2
,
where exogenous forcing EFt from non-CO2 greenhouse gases, aerosols and other pro-
cesses is assumed to follow the process
EFt = EF0 + 0.01(EF100 −EF0)×max{t, 100} .
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Note that it starts out slightly negatively. Our transient feedback adjustment is given
by
χt =
1− feql
1− (feql + ft) .
For more details, see Lemoine and Traeger (2010).
B Numerical method and implementation
We approximate the value function by the collocation method, employing Chebychev
polynomials. We solve the Bellman equation for its ﬁxed point by function iteration.
For all models we use seven collocation nodes for each of the state variables captial,
carbon dioxide, technology level and the persistent shock. Along the time dimension,
we ﬁt the function over ten nodes for the model without, and seven nodes for the model
with persistence in the shock. The function iteration is carried out in MATLAB. We
utilize the third party solver KNITRO to carry out the optimization and make use of
the COMPECON toolbox by Miranda and Fackler (2002) in approximating the value
function.
To accomodate the inﬁnite time horizon of our model, we map real time into artiﬁcial
time by the following transformation:
τ = 1− exp[−ιt] ∈ [0, 1] .
This transformation also concentrates the Chebychev nodes at which we evaluate our
Chebychev polynomials in the close future in real time, where most of the exogenously
driven changes take place.
Further, we improve the performance of the recursive numerical model signiﬁcantly
by expressing the relevant variables in eﬀective labor terms. Due to the uncertainty in
the level of technology, we normalize by the deterministic technology level Adet. This is
the level of technology under certainty (with all shocks equal zero, zt = 0 ∀t)
Adett+1 = A
det
t exp [gA,t]
Expressing consumption and capital in eﬀective labor terms results in the deﬁnitions
ct =
Ct
Adett Lt
and kt =
Kt
Adett Lt
. Moreover, we also deﬁne at =
At
Adett
. The normalized
productivity one period ahead is then deﬁned as
a˜t+1 =
A˜t+1
Adett+1
=
exp [g˜A,t]At
exp [gA,t]A
det
t
= exp[z˜]at .
Using all of those new variables we can transform the Bellman equation (4) and deﬁne
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Figure 7: compares the optimal abatement rate and social cost of carbon under certainty
with the DICE growth rate gDICE,t, a high and a low growth rate (gDICE,t ± 0.84%).
the new Bellman equation
V ∗(kτ ,Mτ , aτ , τ, dτ ) = max
cτ ,μτ
c1−ητ
1− η +
exp[−δu + gA,τ1− η + gL,τ ]
1− η × (6)(
E [1− ηV ∗(kτ+Δτ ,Mτ+Δτ , aτ+Δτ , τ +Δτ, dτ+Δτ)]
1−RRA
1−η
) 1−η
1−RRA
.
For details on the transformations and how to regain the original Bellman equation from
the transformed one, see Crost and Traeger (2010).
In the numerical implementation of the model it turns out useful to maximize over
the abatement cost Λt, which is a strictly monotonic transformation of μt (see equation
5). This switch of variables turns the constraints on the optimization problem linear.
C Further results
Figure 7 shows the impact of varying the growth rate in a deterministic environment.
The three growth rates represented correspond to the original DICE-2007 growth rate,
a 0.84 percent decrease, and a 0.84 increase at all times. The left panel in Figure 7
shows the optimal abatement rate and the right panel shows the optimal social cost
of carbon (SCC). The diﬀerences in the three time paths reﬂects the importance of
growth for the timing and level of abatement. The higher the deterministic growth rate,
the lower the initial CO2 abatement: Wealth is taken from rich future generations and
transferred to the relatively poorer current generations by depreciating environmental
capital. In the lowest growth scenario the optimal policy never reaches full abatement
(not shown). With relatively high growth, abatement increases steeply, is between 12
and 13 percent higher after 100 years, and reaches full abatement more than 50 years
earlier as compared to the DICE-2007 baseline. Observe that the deterministic growth
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Figure 8: compares the optimal abatement rate and social cost of carbon under certainty
and ex ante uncertainty with σ(x) = gA,0/
√
20.
rate changes all imply a non-monotonic change of the abatement rate with respect to
the original deterministic DICE-2007 baseline. In contrast, our uncertainty simulation
all change the optimal climate policy into a single direction, increasing abatement and
SCC for η = 2 and decreasing abatement and SCC for η = 2/3. Figure 8 shows that a
probability weighted averaging of the deterministic runs has almost no eﬀect on optimal
policy.7 Such probabilistic averaging, or Monte-Carlo analysis, of deterministic runs is
sometimes performed as a ﬁrst approximation to modeling uncertainty.
Figure 9 shows that persistence in the growth shock also increases the negative eﬀect
of uncertainty on mitigation in the setting with a low propensity to smooth consumption
over time, where η = 2/3 (and RRA = 10). Numerically the case of η = 2/3 is
harder than the case where η = 2 because the parameter choice eﬀectively reduces the
contraction of the Bellman equation (6). Thus, we had to settle for a considerably
lower levels of uncertainty, still showing how persistence increases the negative eﬀect of
uncertainty on mitigation.
7The ﬁgure averages ﬁve runs corresponding to Gaussian quadrature nodes in a normal distribution
over the permanent growth ‘shock’, where σ(zˆ) = gA,0/
√
20 , E[zˆ] = −σ2(zˆ)/2. Three of these runs
are the ones depicted in Figure 7. The permanent shocks imply major changes to the growth dynamics,
including destabilizing the numerical model. Thus, we chose a relatively smaller variance to illustrate
the eﬀect of Monte-Carlo averaging as opposed to the one chosen in the truly stochastic model.
82
Growth Uncertainty in IAMs
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Abatement rate
year
 %
 o
f p
ot
en
tia
l e
m
is
si
on
s
certainty
RRA=10 σA=.014
RRA=10 ζ=.5 σx=σε=.01
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Social cost of carbon
year
 U
S
$/
tC
certainty
RRA=10 σA=.014
RRA=10 ζ=.5 σx=σε=.01
Figure 9: compares the optimal abatement rate and the social cost of carbon under
certainty, iid uncertainty and persistent uncertainty with persistence ζ = 0.5 for RRA =
10 and η = 2/3.
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Table 1: Parameters of the model
Economic Parameters
η 2
3
, 2 intertemporal consumption smoothing preference
RRA 0, 2, 9.5, 50 coeﬃcient of relative Arrow-Pratt risk aversion
b1 0.00284 damage coeﬃcient; for uncertain scenario normally
distributed with standard deviation 0.0013 (low) and
0.0025 (high)
b2 2 damage exponent; for uncertain scenario normally dis-
tributed with standard deviation 0.35 (low) and 0.5
(high)
δu 1.5% pure rate of time preference
L0 6514 in millions, population in 2005
L∞ 8600 in millions, asymptotic population
g∗L 0.035 rate of convergence to asymptotic population
K0 137 in trillion 2005-USD, initial global capital stock
δK 10% depreciation rate of capital
κ 0.3 capital elasticity in production
A0 0.0058 initial labor productivity; corresponds to total factor
productivity of 0.02722 used in DICE
gA,0 1.31% initial growth rate of labor productivity; corresponds to
total factor productivity of 0.9% used in DICE
δA 0.1% rate of decline of productivity growth rate
σ0 0.1342 CO2 emission per unit of GDP in 2005
gσ,0 −0.73% initial rate of decarbonization
δσ 0.3% rate of decline of the rate of decarbonization
a0 1.17 cost of backstop 2005
a1 2 ratio of initial over ﬁnal backstop cost
a2 2.8 cost exponent
gΨ −0.5% rate of convergence from initial to ﬁnal backstop cost
Climatic Parameters
T0 0.76 in
◦C, temperature increase of preindustrial in 2005
Mpreind 596 in GtC, preindustiral stock of CO2 in the atmosphere
M0 808.9 in GtC, stock of atmospheric CO2 in 2005
δM,0 1.7% initial rate of decay of CO2 in atmosphere
δM,∞ 0.25% asymptotic rate of decay of CO2 in atmosphere
δ∗M 3% rate of convergence to asymptotic decay rate of CO2
B0 1.1 in GtC, initial CO2 emissions from LUCF
gB −1% growth rate of CO2 emisison from LUCF
s 3.08 climate sensitivity, i.e. equilibrium temperature re-
sponse to doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentration
with respect to preindustrial concentrations
EF0 −0.06 external forcing in year 2000
EF100 .3 external forcing in year 2100 and beyond
σforc 3.2% warming delay, heat capacity atmosphere
σocean 0.7% warming delay, ocean related
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Chapter IV
Optimally Climate Sensitive Policy: A
Comprehensive Evaluation of Uncertainty &
Learning (w. Christian Traeger)
Abstract
The long-run relation between greenhouse gas concentrations and temperatures is cur-
rently unknown. We learn this climate sensitivity over the next decades and centuries by
observing stochastic global temperatures. This paper analyzes the eﬀects of stochastic
temperatures and uncertain climate sensitivity on optimal mitigation and investment
policy in a Bayesian learning model. We ﬁnd that stochasticity of temperature increases
optimal capital investment, while uncertainty about climate sensitivity increases opti-
mal greenhouse gas mitigation. The scientiﬁc community has not reached a consensus
about the Bayesian prior governing climate sensitivity. We address this lack of conﬁ-
dence into the Bayesian prior by modeling deep uncertainty in terms of ambiguity and
smooth ambiguity aversion. We ﬁnd that ambiguity aversion has a negligible eﬀect on
welfare and no eﬀect on optimal policy.
Keywords
climate change, uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, smooth ambiguity model, Bayesian
learning, recursive utility, dynamic programming, integrated assessment, DICE
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1 Introduction
The scientiﬁc community has been aware of the greenhouse eﬀect for several decades,
but is still greatly uncertain about the long-term temperature change induced by a
given level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Climate sensitivity characterizes how
a doubling of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere aﬀects the global mean surface
temperatures in the long-run equilibrium. The climate system’s complexity makes an
assessment of climate sensitivity diﬃcult. Temperatures ﬂuctuate and feedback pro-
cesses take time until they become clearly observable. Yet climate sensitivity lies at
the core of the economic climate change problem: It determines the cost of GHG emis-
sions. If the true value turns out high, temperatures will rise strongly and cause severe
damages. If temperatures hardly react to emissions, then we should not cut back on
economic production in order to mitigate GHGs. Our current decisions have to deal
with uncertainty over the true value of climate sensitivity and stochastic global surface
temperatures which will cover up the true climate sensitivity for decades if not centuries
to come.
In this paper we analyze how temperature stochasticity, uncertainty about climate
sensitivity, and learning aﬀect optimal GHG mitigation policies. For that purpose, we
translate the widely employed integrated assessment model DICE by Nordhaus (2008)
into a recursive dynamic programming model. The stochasticity of temperatures for
any given climate sensitivity determines the speed of learning. At the same time, this
stochasticity increases expected damages in a world governed by damages that are con-
vex in temperatures. We disentangle the eﬀect temperature stochasticity has on optimal
policies from the eﬀect of uncertainty about the climate sensitivity. We ﬁnd that temper-
ature stochasticity aﬀects investment, increasing the capital stock and, thus, future pro-
duction and emissions. In contrast, uncertainty about the long-run GHG-temperature
relation increases the optimal abatement rate. We show how these two eﬀects interact
under diﬀerent speeds of learning.
The scientiﬁc community does not agree on a particular prior on climate sensitivity.
This prior is a much more subjective distribution than e.g. the stochasticity of tem-
peratures from one year to the next. We extend our model to explicitly distinguish
between attitudes with respect to mostly objective stochasticity and subjective, or low
conﬁdence uncertainty. For this purpose, we employ Klibanoﬀ et al. (2009)’s smooth
ambiguity model and analyze the eﬀect of ambiguity aversion on optimal climate policy.
Ambiguity aversion captures the attitude of decision makers who prefer a world with
well known probabilities to a world governed by subjective guesstimates. Traeger (2011)
shows that the smooth ambiguity model is fully rational once a decision maker acknowl-
edges that objective and subjective lotteries are distinct objects.1 Like any decision
1The model satisﬁes in particular time consistency and is a straightforward adaptation of the classical
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maker can have diﬀerent preference about apples and bananas, he can also have diﬀer-
ent risk attitudes with respect to high conﬁdence and with respect to low conﬁdence
probabilistic estimates.
Closest to our analysis is the seminal work by Kelly and Kolstad (1999), who inves-
tigate Bayesian learning about climate sensitivity in a similar model. While Kelly and
Kolstad (1999) analyze learning time in much detail, they pay relatively little attention
to the precise eﬀects of uncertainty and stochasticity on optimal policies. They compare
a situation in which the initial Bayesian prior is lower than the true value of climate
sensitivity to the optimal policy given this true value is known with certainty. They
do the same in a case in which the prior is higher than the true value. They ﬁnd that
the optimal abatement rate under learning is initially closer to the case of a low true
climate sensitivty value. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the optimal abatement rate is closer
to the high scenario, i.e. the decision maker hedges against the bad outcome. This
diﬀerence results from our more symmetric comparison as well as most likely our higher
numerical precision. Our focus, however, is not on the comparison of learning scenarios
in which the climate sensitivity is either lower or higher than the expected value. We
analyze how a mean preserving spread over the prior changes the optimal policy, i.e.,
we compare scenarios that diﬀer in uncertainty and in stochasticity, but keep expected
values constant. Our analysis therefore requires more numerical precision (beneﬁting
from the evolving computational power and a more precise approximation procedure).
We disentangle eﬀects of stochasticity and deep uncertainty, and analyze how ambigu-
ity aversion aﬀects the optimal policies. Moreover, the early DICE model employed
by Kelly and Kolstad (1999) implies extremely low optimal abatement in the range of
7.5 − 13% of total emissions in the current century, vastly diﬀerent mitigation policy’s
than our currently used DICE-2007 version.
Leach (2007) expands the work by Kelly and Kolstad (1999) by modeling a second
climate parameter, the warming delay, as uncertain. He ﬁnds that modeling more than
a single parameter as uncertain may practically prohibit learning. He also considers the
eﬀect on optimal abatement in his setting, suggesting that a decision maker may lower
abatement rates in order to speed up learning. Also Leach (2007) focuses on the process
and speed of learning more than on the implications for optimal abatement policies.
In fact, we ﬁnd that in our model the speed of learning has very little inﬂuence on
the currently optimal policies, much less than the level of stochasticity and the prior
uncertainty.
Millner et al. (2010) and Lemoine and Traeger (2010) relate to our analysis in that
they model ambiguity aversion in the context of climate sensitivity. Millner et al. (2010)
assume that the decision maker has a prior over the right model governing the warming
of the world. These models diﬀer based on diﬀerent climate sensitivity distributions
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.
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taken from the scientiﬁc literature. For a given climate sensitivity distribution, the
authors generate the evolution of consumption in each of these models. In every period
the decision maker averages over the diﬀerent models with an exogenous, ambiguous
distribution, exhibiting smooth ambiguity aversion. The authors ﬁnd that ambiguity
aversion has small welfare eﬀects given the standard DICE damage function and large
welfare eﬀects when employing a more convex damage function. In contrast to Millner
et al. (2010) we do not analyze the welfare eﬀect of a given policy, but derive the optimal
policy under uncertainty. Moreover, our decision maker behaves as a fully consistent
Bayesian learner.
Lemoine and Traeger (2010) model abrupt and irreversible changes in climate sensi-
tivity once the climate system crosses an a priori unkown temperature threshold. The
learning in their model reduces to realizing that any temperature level reached without
crossing the threshold is safe. Before and after crossing the threshold the climate sen-
sitivity is known deterministically. In contrast, our decision maker learns the climate
sensitivity smoothly over the course of decades and centuries. Lemoine and Traeger
(2010) capture an extreme of sudden irreversible changes due to highly non-convex
feedback processes. There, learning ahead of time is impossible. In contrast, we capture
a world with smooth feedbacks and continuous learning. Moreover, the decision maker
in Lemoine and Traeger (2010) can reduce the ambiguous risk of crossing a threshold by
reducing emissions. In our model, the decision maker can only reduce her uncertainty
about the ambiguous climate sensitivity prior by increasing emissions in order to learn
faster. This diﬀerence translates into a diﬀerent eﬀect of ambiguity aversion in the two
models.
2 Model
We model a Ramsey growth economy that interacts with the climate system. Emissions
increase the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which heat the planet. Heating
the atmosphere takes time and eventually increases the surface temperature. Climate
sensitivity measures the relation between the greenhouse gas stock and the long-run-
equilibrium temperature. Our social planner has an initial prior over climate sensitivity
and updates this prior based on her observations (learning). She invests into capital
and purchases emission reductions. Her optimal decisions anticipate learning.
We formulate our model as a discrete time, inﬁnite horizon dynamic programming
problem and introduce period by period temperature stochasticity. To model learning
about climate sensitivity we employ Bayesian inference. Using the smooth ambiguity
model by Klibanoﬀ et al. (2009), we specify separate preferences for risk and ambiguity.
The decision maker maximizes welfare subject to the constraints imposed by the climate
system and the economy. We characterize the economy, the climate system and the
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Figure 1: The main relations in the climate-enriched economy model. Control variables
are represented by dashed rectangles. Main state variables are depicted by solid rect-
angles. Climate sensitivity (‘CS’) is uncertain. The decision maker has a prior over its
value (2 state variables). Temperature is stochastic.
interactions between them in a modiﬁed version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008). First, we
reformulate it as a recursive dynamic programming problem. The recursive structure
enables the analysis of stochasticity and deep uncertainty: (Stochastic) temperature
and the decision maker’s prior over climate sensitivity are captured by state variables.
In addition, the smooth ambiguity preferences are deﬁned recursively and can only be
employed in a dynamic programming setting. Second, we replace its climate system
consisting of three equilibrating carbon sinks by an single atmospheric stock of carbon.
This simpliﬁcation is necessary to reduce the computational burden and circumvent the
‘curse of dimensionality’. Figure 1 depicts a stylized representation of our model, and
Appendix A contains the complete mathematical representation.
2.1 Bayesian learning about climate sensitivity
The decision maker learns the value of climate sensitivity from observing the CO2 stock
Mt and temperatures Tt over time. We assume that she knows all the transient feedbacks
that are not part of climate sensitivity. She believes that the following initial prior Π(s)
governs climate sensitivity
s˜0 ∼ Π(s) = N (μs,0, σ2s,0) with μs,0 = 3 σ2s,0 = 1, 2 .
Most commonly, estimates of climate sensitivity take fat-tailed distributional forms such
as the log-normal. To simplify the characterization of learning, we assume a normal
distribution. Given this limitation, σ2s,0 = 3 is a rounded-up empirical approximation to
the set of distributions found in IPCC (2007). To analyze the dynamics of learning, we
vary the prior variance over the interval [1, 2].2
2We also analyze σ2s,0 = 3, and the results are qualitatively the same. Given some minor remaining
numerical challenges, we use σ2s,0 = 2 instead.
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Every period the decision maker updates this prior. Precisely, she foresees what a
future realization of the temperature teaches her about climate sensitivity distribution.
Conditional on a given value of climate sensitivity s and, thus, the expected value of
temperature μT,t, we assume a normal temperature distribution capturing stochasticity
of temperature
T˜t ∼ N (μT,t(s), σ2T ) with σ2T = 0.05, 0.2, 0.7 .
The variance σ2T is exogenously given temperature volatility. Empirical estimates suggest
annual volatility in global mean temperature in the order of maginitude of σ2T = 0.05.
3
For most of our analysis we will use considerably larger values. The reason is three-
fold. First, this estimate measures only global averages, whereas the within-country
ﬂuctuations are signiﬁcantly larger, closer to our next higher value of σ2T = 0.2. The
eﬀective damage increase of stochastic temperatures is captured better by a country’s
temperature volatility. Second, our analysis assumes that climate sensitivity is the only
uncertain parameter whilst every other climate parameter is known. Modeling multiple
parameters as uncertain slows learning considerably (Leach, 2007). Higher stochasticity
of the temperature also captures this reduction in the speed of learning. Third, and
that motivates our value of σ2T = 0.7, we use a high value of climate sensitivity to better
disentangle temperature stochasticity, climate sensitivity uncertainty, and learning. In
particular, the high stochasticity reduces learning signiﬁcantly and allows us to isolate
the eﬀect of uncertainty about climate sensitivity.
The temperature mean depends on climate sensitivity s
μT,t = s χt(Mt, t) + ξ(Tt, t)
where
χt(Mt, t) = σforc
log Mt+1
Mpre
log 2
+
EFt
ηforc
, and (1)
ξ(Tt, t) = (1− σforc)Tt − σoceanΔTt .
The factors in (1) describe the global warming dynamics of our model. The multi-
plicative factor χt captures forcing given CO2 in addition to other, exogenous radiative
forcing. The additive factor ξt contains forcing from temperature and warming delay
caused by atmospheric as well as the oceans’ heat capacity. Those are so called transient
feedbacks.
The decision maker’s posterior in period t is the prior conditional on historic temper-
ature realizations Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt). This posterior also depends on the historic CO2 stock
3Kelly and Kolstad (1999) and Leach (2007) both use σ2T = 0.1. Averaging temperatures over
174 countries and estimating yearly ﬂuctuations with respect to a common trend over 109 years results
instead in the lower σ2T = 0.04. We thank Christian Almer from the University of Bern for this estimate.
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information which we suppress for notational convenience. Given the current stock Mt,
a realization of temperature Tˆt+1 in the subsequent period results in the updated pos-
terior Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt+1). In Appendix B we show that the updated posteriors are again
normally distributed so that at all times Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt) = N (μs,t, σ2s,t) for some μs,t and
σ2s,t. Moreover, we prove the following updating rules for the expected value
μs,t+1 =
χ2tσ
2
s,t
Tˆt+1−ξt
χt
+ σ2Tμs,t
χ2tσ
2
s,t + σ
2
T
and the variance
σs,t+1 =
σ2Tσ
2
s,t
χ2tσ
2
s,t + σ
2
T
. (2)
The new expected value of the parameter s is a weighted mean of the previous expected
value and the inferred “climate sensitivity observation”, Tˆt+1−ξt
χt
. The weight on the
new observation is proportional to the precision (the inverse of the variance) of the
temperature and the magnitude of the multiplicative factor χt, which increases in the
carbon stock. The decision maker learns faster the lower the temperature stochasticity
and the larger the carbon stock. This insight follows from observing that the ﬁrst
summand in the bracket in equation (2) grows in 1/σ2T and in χt.
When we evaluate under ambiguity, we need to treat the two uncertainty layers sep-
arately rather than using the predictive distribution. The likelihood function capturing
temperature stochasticity in equation (6) corresponds to risk and the decision maker
evaluates it as usual. The uncertainty characterized by the posterior and governing
the unkown climate sensitivity s corresponds to ambiguity and is evaluated using the
additional aversion function.
2.2 Welfare speciﬁcation and Bellman equation
The decision maker distinguishes between (objective) risk and subjective uncertainty.
We model those two preferences by two diﬀerent aggregator functions (Klibanoﬀ et al.,
2009). The social planner has standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) pref-
erences with η = 2. This utility function describes her risk aversion as well as her
desire to smooth consumption over time.4 In the second aggregator function f(z) =
[(1 − η)z] 1−RAA1−η , RAA characterizes aversion to subjective risk.5 Given those prefer-
4Those two preferences are a priori unrelated and could be disentangled as well, see Traeger (2012).
5RAA stands for: Constant coeﬃcient of Relative Ambiguity Aversion. Traeger (2012) deﬁnes the
measure analogously to Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion.
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ences, the Bellman equation reads6
V (kt,Mt, t, Tt, μs,t, σs,t) = max
ct,μt
Lt
(
ct
Lt
)1−η
1− η +
exp[−δu]
1− η × (3){∫
Θ
(
(1− η)Eψ(s)
[
V (kt+1,Mt+1, t+ 1, T˜t+1, μs,t+1, σs,t+1)
]) 1−RAA
1−η
dΠ(s)
} 1−η
1−RAA
.
Welfare today is the maximized sum of instantaneous welfare from population (Lt)
weighted per capita consumption ct/Lt and expected future welfare. The state variables
capital k, CO2 stock M , time t, temperature T , and the climate sensitivity prior s
completely describe the state of the climate and the economy. For a particular realization
of climate sensitivity, temperature is stochastic and normally distributed, N (μT,t(s), σ2T ).
The expectation operator in the inner bracket takes expected future welfare with respect
to this well-known stochasticity. In addition, the decision maker is subjectively uncertain
about climate sensitivity over which he has the prior Π(s) ∼ N (μs,t, σ2s,t). The integral
with respect to the prior Π expresses this second uncertainty integration. The ambiguity
aversion function f(z) = [(1− η)z] 1−RAA1−η curves the argument of this second uncertainty
aggregation additionally, expressing additional aversion because of the low conﬁdence
over the prior. Observe that for RAA = η the additional aversion vanishes and the
Bellman equation collapses to its standard form.
The social planner maximizes the dynamic programming equation (3) by choosing
abatement μt
7 and consumption ct, subject to the set of equations characterizing the
climate embedded economy.
The social cost of carbon is the welfare cost caused by the marginal emission unit.
We recover the optimal social cost of carbon from the value function as the ratio of the
marginal value of a ton of carbon and the marginal value of a unit of the consumption
good
SCCt =
∂MtV (·)
∂KtV (·)
.
The so called “balanced growth equivalent” measures welfare eﬀects of a set of op-
timal abatement and consumption policies (Mirrlees and Stern, 1972; Anthoﬀ and Tol,
2009). It is the per capita consumption c¯ that, growing at some ﬁxed rate g, would yield
the same welfare as the (optimal) policy A
c¯A(·) =
[
(1− η)V A(·)
L∞
1−exp[(1−η)g−δu]
− L∞−L0
1−exp[(1−η)g−δu−g∗L]
] 1
1−η
.
6For numerical reasons we express several variables in our model in eﬀective labor terms. In (3) ct
and kt are normalized. For a description of the reformulation of the dynamic programming equation,
see Crost and Traeger (2011).
7In the model we maximize with respect to abatement cost Λ(μ). This variable switch linearizes the
constraints.
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We can conveniently compare the policies under two alternative scenarios A and B by
the percentage diﬀerence in their respective balanced growth equivalents
ΔAB c¯(·) = c¯
A − c¯B
c¯A
= 1−
[
V B(·)
V A(·)
] 1
1−η
.
2.3 Numerical implementation
We solve the dynamic programming equation (3) by function iteration, using the colloca-
tion method to approximate the value function. As basis functions we choose Chebychev
polynomials with 22, 400 Chebychev nodes and coeﬃcients8. The normal distributions
for temperature stochasticity and the climate sensitivity prior are approximated by
Gauss-Legendre quadrature with 3 nodes each9, resulting in a total of 9 nodes for the
predictive distribution of temperature. The code is written in Matlab. We use the Com-
pEcon toolbox by Miranda and Fackler (2002) to generate and evaluate the Chebychev
polynomials, and let the solver KNITRO to carry out the optimization.
3 Stochasticity, uncertainty and learning
In this section we present the results for three diﬀerent scenarios that build upon each
other: Pure temperature stochasticity, climate sensitivity uncertainty and learning. We
discuss ambiguity aversion separately in Section 4.
3.1 Temperature stochasticity
Figure 2 presents our results for pure temperature stochasticity. In this scenario, the
decision maker knows the climate sensitivity. The four panels show the abatement
rate, the social cost of carbon, the investment rate and emissions over the ﬁrst 100
years. We distinguish three scenarios: deterministic temperature (‘certainty’) and three
levels of stochasticity (σ2T = 0.05, 0.2, 0.7). To generate the stochastic paths, we draw
the expected value of temperature in each period, such that each period the shock is
zero. This procedure ensures that for a given set of abatement and investment policies,
temperatures coincide under certainty and stochasticity.
We ﬁnd that even high temperature stochasticity has no discernible eﬀect on the
optimal abatement policy and the associated social cost of carbon. Individual shocks
have no direct lasting impact on the climate system, so the decision maker sees no need
to accomodate them by adjusting abatement. Investment in manmade capital however
increases. All else equal, a high temperature realization causes high damages for one
period. Production falls, and hence investment (in absolute terms) is lower. Thus
8Along each dimension of the state space: k = 7,M = 4, t = 8, T = 4, c = 5, s = 5.
9Results are unaﬀected by increasing the number of Gauss-Legendre nodes for temperature to 5.
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Figure 2: Abatement rate, optimal social cost of carbon, emissions and investment rate for the
ﬁrst 100 years with certain and stochastic temperature and 3 diﬀerent temperature variances,
σ2T = 0.05, σ
2
T = 0.2 and σ
2
T = 0.7.
the single shock is propagated via the capital stock and remains in the economy for
multiple time periods. To insure against this expected welfare loss, the decision maker
invests more in manmade capital at any given time. The higher level of investment
leads to a higher capital stock which eventually increases total emissions. In the present
setting, temperature stochasticity alone hence does not inﬂuence the optimal social cost
of carbon. Of course, this result crucially depends on the absence of non-linear, self-
enforcing feedbacks (the melting of the Antarctic ice-sheet, or methane release from
thawing permafrost, for example).
3.2 Climate sensitivity uncertainty
Figure 3 shows the same set of graphs as Figure 2. Temperature is stochastic with
σ2T = 0.7, whereas climate sensitivity is either known with certainty or subjectively
uncertain with a climate sensitivity prior mean of μs,0 = 3. We distinguish two possible
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Figure 3: Abatement rate, social cost of carbon, emissions and investment rate for the ﬁrst 100
years with stochastic temperature (σ2T = .7) and uncertain climate sensitivity. The unbiased
prior mean is μs,0 = 3. Initial prior variances are σ
2
s,0 = 1 and σ
2
s,0 = 2.
prior variances, σ2s,0 = 1 and σ
2
s,0 = 2. Again we plot the paths along the expected
values for temperature stochasticity. The decision maker’s climate sensitivity prior is
unbiased, so her expectation coincides with the true value.
Subjective uncertainty about the value of climate sensitivity modestly raises the
abatement rate. With a temperature stochasticity of σ2T = 0.7, initially 14.1% of emis-
sions are abated. This rate increases to 44.7% after 100 years. With climate sensitivity
uncertainty and an initial prior of N (3, 2), abatement starts out at 15.6% and rises
to 47.8% over the ﬁrst century. The initial rate is about 9% higher for the case with
uncertainty and learning, and this diﬀerence falls over the century to approximately
6.5%.10
The decision maker acts precautiously in the face of possibly very diﬀerent realities:
In comparison to stochasticity, subjective uncertainty means the “realized shock” lasts
10For σ2s,0 = 1 the abatement rates are 14.9% (2000) and 46.6% (2100) respectively.
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as long as the carbon stock, i.e. for several centuries. Learning is extremely slow, which
we infer from the lack of convergence in the curves for uncertain and certain climate
sensitivity (We can also see the learning speed directly in Figure 4). Therefore we inter-
pret these results as caused by uncertainty, not learning. The temperature stochasticity
σ2T = 0.7 is so high that a single temperature observation recieves very little weight when
the decision maker updates her prior, and the decision maker anticipates that she will
learn very little. Unlike stochastic temperature, subjective uncertainty does not aﬀect
the investment rate, such that higher abatement rates translate without moderation
into lower emissions. We observe an interesting dichotomy: Temperature stochastic-
ity aﬀects economic policy (investment), whereas climate sensitvity uncertainty changes
climate policies (abatement).
3.3 Learning about climate sensitivity
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Figure 4: Climate sensitivity prior variance σ2s,t for initial values σ
2
s,0 = 2 and σ
2
s,0 = 1 over
time for three diﬀerent values of temperature stochasticity (σ2T = 0.05, 0.2, 0.7).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the climate sensitivity prior variance for 100 years
for two diﬀerent initial priors and three diﬀerent values of temperature stochasticity.
Temperature is realized at its expected value, therefore the climate sensitivity prior
mean remains unchanged at μs,0 = μs,t = 3. The expectations of the decision maker
are conﬁrmed with every single observation, yet for σ2T = 0.7 her conﬁdence in her prior
does increase only slightly over the ﬁrst 100 years when temperature stochasticity is
high. The two solid lines correspond to the scenarios in Figure 3. Only with lower levels
of temperature volatility, in particular σ2T = 0.05, meaningful learning takes place.
How does learning at diﬀerent speeds translate optimal abatement policies? We
compare learning for the three diﬀerent values of temperature stochasticity in Figure
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Figure 5: Abatement rate, social cost of carbon, investment rate and emissions for the ﬁrst
100 years with uncertain climate sensitivity with initial prior variance σ2s,0 = 2. Three diﬀerent
temperature stochasticities: σ2T = .05, σ
2
T = .2 and σ
2
T = .7.
5. Again we display the abatement rate, the social cost of carbon, investment and
emissions. The paths for high temperature stochasticity (σ2T = .7) and known climate
sensitivity (‘CS certain’) are the same as in Figure 3. The new abatement paths with
lower temperature volatilities start out at the same level as their high volatility counter-
part, conﬁrming that temperature stochasticity by itself has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. But
rather immediately the diﬀerence in conﬁdence in the prior becomes apparent, as the
diﬀerent paths approach the level of pure temperature stochasticity at diﬀerent speeds.
We also observe an interesting interaction between climate and economy for emissions:
The emission paths for σ2T = .2 and σ
2
T = .7 cross. Investment increases permanently,
as the temperature stochasticity is irreducible. For high stochasticity σ2T = .7 also the
impact from subjective uncertainty last for the entire century. For σ2T = .2 on the con-
trary, the increase in abatement wears oﬀ as the decision maker becomes more conﬁdent
over time. Hence emissions increase faster, and eventually overtake emissions for the
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high stochasticity scenario. We do not observe active learning: As the investment rate
remains the same, the decision maker does not increase emissions in order to speed up
the learning process.11
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Figure 6: Abatement rate and dynamics of climate sensitivity prior mean (μs,0 = 3) for
varying levels of true climate sensitivity (‘CS’). Variance σ2s,0 = 2 and temperature stochasticity
σ2T = 0.05. True climate sensitivity 2, 3 and 4.
Another important aspect of the learning dynamics is the correction of wrong ex-
pectations. In Figure 6 we show how a decision maker with a wrong initial prior adjusts
abatement, and how the mean of her prior evolves. Here we use the low, empirically ac-
curate temperature volatility of σ2T = 0.05. Correcting the wrong belief takes long, even
with low temperature volatility. Secondly, the decision maker insures herself against a
“too low” expected climate sensitivity: The initial abatement rate under uncertainty is
biased towards the optimal policy under high, certain climate sensitivity.12
4 Ambiguity aversion
Ambiguity aversion captures the attitude of a decision maker who prefers a world with
well known probabilities to a world governed by subjective guesstimates. In the case
of subjectively uncertain climate sensitivity the decision maker’s ability to change or
avoid subjective uncertainty is limited. She can increase her emissions in order to learn
faster. However, the learning comes at the cost of being even worse-oﬀ in the situation
where climate sensitivity turns out to be high. We ﬁnd that overall ambiguity aversion
has virtually no eﬀect on optimal policies (Figure 7). The ambiguity averse social
planner acts identically to one who evaluates risk and subjective uncertainty equally.
Figure 9 shows an excerpt of the optimal abatement policy for the ambiguity averse
11This contradicts the result by Leach (2007) in a setting with two uncertain parameters.
12This result is inconsistent with Kelly and Kolstad (1999), who however note that they face numerical
diﬃculties.
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Figure 7: Abatement rate, social cost of carbon, investment rate and emissions for the ﬁrst
100 years with stochastic temperature (σ2T = .7), uncertain climate sensitivity with initial
prior variance σ2s,0 = 2 and ambiguity aversion of RAA = 10 and RAA = 100.
social planner. It is identical to the corresponding control rule of a decision maker
who has standard preferences. Abatement increases in temperature and in the the
subjective uncertainty. Also, no loss in welfare is experienced even with strong aversion
to subjectivity. In the same Figure, the value function is displayed. Whereas welfare
is decreasing and slightly concave in temperature, reﬂecting the damages associated
with warming, the conﬁdence in expected climate sensitivity (σ2s,0) has no eﬀect on
welfare. Figure 8 compares the balanced growth equivalent for an ambiguity averse
decision maker to a standard expected utility maximizer. The percentage diﬀerence in
per capita consumption that makes them equally well oﬀ is in the order of magnitude
of 10−5, or numerically zero.
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Figure 8: Diﬀerence in balanced growth equivalent between expected utility maximizer and
ambiguity averse decision maker with RAA = 10.
ΔRAA10−learnc¯ = c¯
RAA10−c¯learn
c¯RAA10
. Plotted over climate sensitivity prior variance and temperature
for the year 2020, a carbon stock of 896 GtC (421 ppm CO2), a capital stock of 171 US trillion
dollars and a climate sensitivity prior mean of μs,0 = 3.
Figure 9: Value function and control rule for an ambiguity averse decision maker with RAA =
10 for the year 2020, a carbon stock of 896 GtC (421 ppm CO2), a capital stock of 171 US
trillion dollars and a climate sensitivity prior mean of μs,0 = 3.
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5 Conclusions
We incorporate stochastic temperature, deep Bayesian uncertainty about climate sen-
sitivity, and ambiguity aversion into a widely used model of integrated climate change
assessment. Stochastic temperatures aﬀect both, the speed of learning and the expected
damages. Isolating the damage eﬀect we show that it slightly increases optimal invest-
ment but leaves the optimal abatement rate and SCC largely untouched. In consequence,
increased investment and growth lead to a slight increase in the optimal emission level.
Uncertainty about the climate sensitivity counteracts this eﬀect by increasing the opti-
mal abatement rate. Over time, learning reduces uncertainty, but the uncertainty eﬀect
dominates at least for the remainder of the current century in reducing the optimal
absolute level of GHG emissions.
The prior over climate sensitivity relies necessarily on incomplete climate models
and the literature suggests a variety of diﬀerent functional forms for the probability
distribution. We choose the normal distribution because of its convenience in modeling
Bayesian learning in a dynamic optimizing model. While other forms are closer to
current estimates, any individual prior by itself will lack conﬁdence by a major part of
the scientiﬁc community. We therefore extend our analysis by considering the Bayesian
prior as an ambiguous distribution. We analyze the policy eﬀect of aversion against
the lack of conﬁdence into these priors and ﬁnd that ambiguity aversion has virtually
no eﬀect on our optimal policies. The important consequence of this ﬁnding is that
even if uncertainty about climate sensitivity is large, and even if we do not trust any
given guess of the distribution, we should still simply follow the results of the Bayesian
learning model.
The main message of our model is that even deep uncertainty about the relation
between GHG emissions and climate change should not make us wait and see. In
contrast, we ﬁnd that this uncertainty increases optimal current abatement. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that the precise speed of learning, which has been a major focus of earlier
analyses, is not of major relevance for current policies. Interesting extensions of the
model include more convex damage functions and fat-tailed climate sensitivity priors.
Both of these extensions would increase the eﬀects of temperature stochasticity and
uncertainty about climate sensitivity, and the main question would be whether the
eﬀects still balance in a similar way. While increased damage convexity mostly enhances
the damage eﬀects of stochasticity, fat tails can decrease the speed of learning.
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Appendix
A Details on the climate enriched economy model
The following model is largely a reproduction of DICE-2007. The three most notable
diﬀerences are the annual time step (DICE-2007 features ten year time periods), the
inﬁnite time horizon, and the replacement of the carbon sink structure by a decay
rate. This simpliﬁcation is neccessary because each carbon sink would require an own
state variable in a recursive framework, which is computationally too costly. For a
detailed description of the procedure, see Crost and Traeger (2011). All parameters are
characterized and quantiﬁed in Table B on page 110.
Carbon in the atmosphere is accumulated according to
Mt+1 = Mpre + (Mt −Mpre) (1− δM(t)) + Et with
δM,t = δM,∞ + (δM,0 − δM,∞) exp[−δ∗M t] .
The stock of CO2 (Mt) exceeding preindustrial levels (Mpre) decays exponentially at the
rate δM(M, t). This decay rate falls exogenously over time to replicate the carbon cycle
in DICE-2007, mimicking that the ocean reservoirs reduce their uptake rate as they ﬁll
up (see Lemoine and Traeger, 2010). The variable Et characterizes yearly CO2 emissions,
consisting of industrial emissions and emissions from land use change an forestry Bt
Et = (1− μt)σtAtLtkκt +Bt .
Emissions from land use change and forestry fall exponentially over time
Bt = B0 exp[gB t] .
Industrial emissions are proportional to gross production AtLtk
κ
t . They can be reduced
by abatement. As in the DICE model, we in addition include an exogenously falling
rate of decarbonization of production σt
σt = σt−1 exp[gσ,t] with gσ,t = gσ,0 exp[−δσ t] .
The economy accumulates capital according to
kt+1 = [(1− δk) kt + yt − ct] exp[−(gA,t + gL,t)] ,
where δK denotes the depreciation rate, yt =
Yt
AtLt
denotes production net of abatement
costs and climate damage per eﬀective labor, and ct denotes aggregate global consump-
tion of produced commodities per eﬀective unit of labor. Population grows exogenously
by
Lt+1 = exp[gL,t]Lt with gL,t =
g∗L
L∞
L∞−L0
exp[g∗L t]− 1
.
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Here L0 denotes the initial and L∞ the asymptotic population. The parameter g
∗
L
characterizes the convergence from initial to asymptotic population. Technology grows
exogenously
A˜t+1 = At exp [g˜A,t] with g˜A,t = gA,0 ∗ exp [−δAt] . (4)
Net global GDP per eﬀective unit of labor is obtained from the gross product per eﬀective
unit of labor as follows
yt =
1− Λ(μt)
1 +D(Tt)
kκt
where
Λ(μt) = Ψtμ
a2
t (5)
characterizes abatement costs as percent of GDP depending on the emission control rate
μt ∈ [0, 1]. The coeﬃcient of the abatement cost function Ψt follows
Ψt =
σt
a2
a0
(
1− (1− exp[gΨ t])
a1
)
with a0 denoting the initial cost of the backstop, a1 denoting the ratio of initial over ﬁnal
backstop, and a2 denoting the cost exponent. The rate gΨ describes the convergence
from the initial to the ﬁnal cost of the backstop.
Climate damage as percent of world GDP depends on the temperature diﬀerence Tt
of current to preindustrial temperatures and is characterized by
D(Tt) = b1T
b2
t .
Nordhaus (2008) estimates b1 = 0.0028 and b2 = 2, implying a quadratic damage
function with a loss of 0.28% of global GDP at a 1 degree Celsius warming.
Exogenous forcing EFt from non-CO2 greenhouse gases, aerosols and other processes
is assumed to follow the process
EFt = EF0 + 0.01(EF100 − EF0)×max{t, 100} .
Note that it starts out slightly negatively. The other relevant temperature change equa-
tions are found in section 2.1 in the main text. For more details, see Lemoine and
Traeger (2010).
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B Updating rules for climate sensitivity prior
This appendix derives the updating rules for the prior and the predictive distribution.
Let lt(xt+1|s) = N (μx,t+1, σ2T |s, xt, ht) denote the likelihood function in period t. Then13
Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt+1) = lt(xt+1|s)Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt)∫∞
−∞
lt(xt+1|s)Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt)ds
. (6)
We the sign ∝ to denote proportionality and suppress the normalization constants of
the distributions, ﬁnding
lt(x|s) Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt) ∝ exp
(
−(x− μx,t+1(s))
2
2σ2T
)
exp
(
−(s− μs,t)
2
2σ2s,t
)
∝ exp
(
−(x− (sχt + ξt))
2
2σ2T
− (s− μs,t)
2
2σ2s,t
)
∝ exp
(
−x
2 − 2x(sχt + ξt) + (sχt + ξt)2
2σ2T
− s
2 − 2sμs,t + μ2s,t
2σ2s,t
)
∝ exp
(
−x
2 − 2xsχt − 2xξt + s2χ2t + 2sχtξt + ξ2t
2σ2T
− s
2 − 2sμs,t + μ2s,t
2σ2s,t
)
∝ exp
(
−1
2
[
s2
(
χ2t
σ2T
+
1
σ2s,t
)
− 2s
(
(x− ξt)χt
σ2T
+
μs,t
σ2s,t
)
+
x2 − 2xξt + ξ2t
σ2T
+
μ2s,t
σ2s,t
])
∝ exp
(
−1
2
[
s2
(
χ2t
σ2T
+
1
σ2s,t
)
− 2s
(
(x− ξt)χt
σ2T
+
μs,t
σ2s,t
)
+
(x− ξt)2
σ2T
+
μ2s,t
σ2s,t
])
∝ exp
⎛
⎝−1
2
(
χ2t
σ2T
+
1
σ2s,t
)⎛⎝s− (x−ξt)χtσ2T + μs,tσ2s,t
χ2t
σ2T
+ 1
σ2s,t
⎞
⎠2
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Π¯
· exp
⎛
⎜⎝−1
2
⎡
⎢⎣−
(
(x−ξt)χt
σ2T
+ μs,t
σ2s,t
)2
χ2t
σ2T
+ 1
σ2s,t
+
(x− ξt)2
σ2T
+
μ2s,t
σ2s,t
⎤
⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎠
∝ Π¯ · exp
⎛
⎜⎜⎝12


( (x−ξt)χt
σ2T
)2
+ 2 (x−ξt)χt
σ2T
μs,t
σ2s,t
+



(
μs,t
σ2s,t
)2
−



(x−ξt)2
σ2T
χ2t
σ2T
− μ2s,t
σ2s,t
χ2t
σ2T
− (x−ξt)2
σ2T
1
σ2s,t
−


μ
2
s,t
σ2s,t
1
σ2s,t
χ2t
σ2
T
+ 1
σ2s,t
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
∝ Π¯ · exp
⎛
⎝− 1
2σ2Tσ
2
s,t
(x− ξt)2 − 2(x− ξt)χtμs,t + μ2s,tχ2t
χ2t
σ2T
+ 1
σ2s,t
⎞
⎠
∝ Π¯ · exp
(
−1
2
(x− ξt − χtμs,t)2
χ2tσ
2
s,t + σ
2
T
)
.
13This simpliﬁed updating equation only using the latest prior and the latest observation is a conse-
quence of our convenient choice of the conjugate prior.
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The following predictive distribution Pt+1 governs the temperature realization in period
t+ 1 incorporating stochasticity and parameter uncertainty
Pt+1(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
lt(xt+1|s)Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt)ds ∝ exp
(
−1
2
(x− ξt − χtμs,t)2
χ2tσ
2
s,t + σ
2
T
)
.
It is the normal distribution N (χtμs,t, χ2tσ2s,t + σ2T ). We ﬁnd the posterior
Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt+1) = lt(xt+1|s)Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt)∫∞
−∞
lt(xt+1|s)Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt)ds
∝ exp
⎛
⎜⎝−1
2
(
χ2t
σ2T
+
1
σ2s,t
)⎛⎝s− (Tˆt+1−ξt)χtσ2T + μs,tσ2s,t
χ2t
σ2T
+ 1
σ2s,t
⎞
⎠
2
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Thus, if Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt) is distributed normally with expected value μs,t and variance σs,t,
then the posterior in the subsequent period Π(s|Tˆ1, ..., Tˆt+1) is also distributed normally
with expected value
μs,t+1 =
χ2t
σ2T
Tˆt+1−ξt
χt
+ 1
σ2s,t
μs,t
χ2t
σ2T
+ 1
σ2s,t
=
χ2tσ
2
s,t
Tˆt+1−ξt
χt
+ σ2Tμs,t
χ2tσ
2
s,t + σ
2
T
and variance
σs,t+1 =
(
χ2t
σ2T
+
1
σ2s,t
)−1
=
σ2Tσ
2
s,t
χ2tσ
2
s,t + σ
2
T
.
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Chapter IV
Table 1: Parameters of the model
Economic Parameters
η 2 intertemporal consumption smoothing and risk aversion
preference
RAA 10, 100 coeﬃcient of relative ambiguity aversion
b1 0.00284 damage coeﬃcient; for uncertain scenario normally
distributed with standard deviation 0.0013 (low) and
0.0025 (high)
b2 2 damage exponent; for uncertain scenario normally dis-
tributed with standard deviation 0.35 (low) and 0.5
(high)
δu 1.5% pure rate of time preference
L0 6514 in millions, population in 2005
L∞ 8600 in millions, asymptotic population
g∗L 0.035 rate of convergence to asymptotic population
K0 137 in trillion 2005-USD, initial global capital stock
δK 10% depreciation rate of capital
κ 0.3 capital elasticity in production
A0 0.0058 initial labor productivity; corresponds to total factor
productivity of 0.02722 used in DICE
gA,0 1.31% initial growth rate of labor productivity; corresponds to
total factor productivity of 0.9% used in DICE
δA 0.1% rate of decline of productivity growth rate
σ0 0.1342 CO2 emission per unit of GDP in 2005
gσ,0 −0.73% initial rate of decarbonization
δσ 0.3% rate of decline of the rate of decarbonization
a0 1.17 cost of backstop 2005
a1 2 ratio of initial over ﬁnal backstop cost
a2 2.8 cost exponent
gΨ −0.5% rate of convergence from initial to ﬁnal backstop cost
Climatic Parameters
T0 0.76 in
◦C, temperature increase of preindustrial in 2005
Mpreind 596 in GtC, preindustiral stock of CO2 in the atmosphere
M0 808.9 in GtC, stock of atmospheric CO2 in 2005
δM,0 1.7% initial rate of decay of CO2 in atmosphere
δM,∞ 0.25% asymptotic rate of decay of CO2 in atmosphere
δ∗M 3% rate of convergence to asymptotic decay rate of CO2
B0 1.1 in GtC, initial CO2 emissions from LUCF
gB −1% growth rate of CO2 emisison from LUCF
s 3.08 climate sensitivity, i.e. equilibrium temperature re-
sponse to doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentration
with respect to preindustrial concentrations
EF0 −0.06 external forcing in year 2000
EF100 .3 external forcing in year 2100 and beyond
σforc 3.2% warming delay, heat capacity atmosphere
σocean 0.7% warming delay, ocean related
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